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Federal Courts and Procedure
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - ATTORNEY'S FAILURE
To FILE APPELLATE BRIEF IN CONFORMANCE WITH THIRD CIRCUIT
RULES RESULTS IN DISMISSAL OF CASE.
Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Insurance Co. (1980)
On August 2, 1977, Mr. and Mrs. Marvin Kushner were injured in
an automobile accident in Zurich, Switzerland.' The Kushners filed
suit against four corporate defendants,2 seeking compensation for the
injuries which they had sustained.3 All defendants filed motions to
dismiss.4 The district court granted the motions of three defendants,5
but denied the motion of the fourth defendant, Hill Refrigeration.6
Hill filed an answer to the complaint 7 and commenced discovery.8
Before the case was ready for trial,9 however, the plaintiffs filed an
appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
-claiming that the district court had erred in dismissing the action as to
three of the four defendants. 10
As required by rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
-dure and Third Circuit Rule 10(3)," the appellants' counsel filed a
1. Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 405 (3d Cir. 1980).
2. Id.
3. Id. Named as defendants were: Emhart A. G., a Swiss corporation; Hill
Refrigeration Division of Emhart Industries, a New Jersey corporation; Emhart
Corporation, a Connecticut company; and Winterhur Swiss Insurance Company,
a New York corporation. Id. Winterhur does business in Switzerland and
-was the liability insurance carrier for Emhart. Id. jurisdiction was based on
diversity of citizenship. Id.
4. Id. All motions to dismiss were filed pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). 620 F.2d
at 405. The motions of defendants Emhart A. G. and Winterthur were also
based upon lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The Third Circuit held that the appeal violated rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Third Circuit Rule 21(l)(A) which gov-
ern the appealability of cases involving multiple parties and claims. 620 F.2d
at 408. For a discussion of rule 54(b) and Third Circuit Rule 21(1)(A), see
note 22 infra.
11. 3D CIR. R. 10(3). For those sections of Rule 10(3) which appellant vio-
lated, see notes 15 & 19 infra. See also rule 30(a) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure which contain the same requirements. FED. R. App. P.
30(a).
(699)
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brief and a separate appendix with the court. 12 But, contrary to the
requirements set forth in Third Circuit Rule 21(2)(A)(g) 13 and rule
32(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the names and ad-
dresses of counsel were not set forth on the cover.1 4 The brief also
violated Third Circuit Rule 10(3)(1)25 and Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 30(a)(1), 16 in that it did not contain the relevant docket
entries of the proceedings below.'7 Lastly, the brief did not comply
with Third Circuit Rule 10(3)(5) in that the index was not paginated, 8
and Rule 10(3)(6) because it did not contain the required notice of
appeal. 10 Pursuant to Third Circuit Rule 21(3),20 the Third Circuit 21
dismissed the appeal, holding, inter alia,22 fhat a failure to file a proper
12. 620 F.2d at 406. The brief was entitled "BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS -
APPELLANTS, MARVIN AND DOLORES KUSHNER - APPENDIX." Id.
13. 3D CIR. R. 21(2)(A)(g).
14. 620 F.2d at 406. Third Circuit Rule 21(2)(A)(g) provides in pertinent
part: "The front covers . . . of the briefs and of the appendices, if separately
printed, shall contain the names and addresses of counsel representing the party
on whose behalf the document is filed." 3D CiR. R. 21(2)(A)(g). See also
FED. R. App. P. 32(A), which contains the same requirement.
15. 3D CIR. R. 10(3)(1). Third Circuit Rule 10(3)(1) provides that the
"appellants shall prepare and file an appendix to the briefs which shall con-
tain: 1) the relevant docket entries in the proceedings below .... ." Id.
16. See FED. R. App. P. 30(A)(1), which contains the same requirements as
3D CIR. R. 10(3)(1). See note 15 supra.
17. 620 F.2d at 406.
18. Id. Third Circuit Rule 10(3)(5) provides that the appendix shall con-
tain "a table of contents with page references." 3D CIR. R. 10(3)(5).
19. 620 F.2d at 406. Third Circuit Rule 10(3)(6) provides that the appen-
dix shall contain "the notice of appeal ....... 3D CIR. R. 10(3)(6).
20. 3D CIR. R. 21(3). Third Circuit Rule 21(3) provides in part: "If the
court shall find that the provisions of this rule have not been adhered to, it
may, in its discretion, impose sanctions as it may deem appropriate, including
but not limited to the dismissal of the appeal, imposition of costs or disciplinary
sanctions upon counsel." Id.
21. The case was heard by Judges Aldisert, Weiss, and Garth. Judge Aldi-
sert wrote the opinion.
22. A second ground of dismissal was lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
620 F.2d at 409. The appellants had failed to comply with Third Circuit Rule
21(l)(A) which provides in pertinent part:
Brief of 'the Appellant or Petitioner. The brief of the appellant
or petitioner shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order
here indicated:
(b)(1) . . . if the appeal is from an action involving multiple
claims or multiple parties, a certification that the final judgment ap-
plies to all claims or parties, or that the district court has made an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and an
express direction for the entry of judgment under F.R.C.P. 54(b) ....
3D CIR. R. 21(l)(A).
The Third Circuit's examination of the district court's order and docket
entries revealed that the district court had not made a determination that there
was no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment
under FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 620 F.2d at 408. With only a few exceptions,
litigants may appeal only upon entry of a final judgment which applies to all
[VOL. 26: p. 699
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appendix in conformity with Third Circuit Rules constitutes grounds
for dismissal of an appeal. Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Insurance Co.,
620 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1980).
As recently as 1977, the Third Circuit examined the problem posed
by an attorney's failure to observe the basic requirements for the format
of briefs and appendices in United States v. Somers.23 In Somers, the
court expressed its reluctance to dismiss appeals for failure to comply
with appellate rules,2 4 but stated that, in the future, "counsels' re-
fusal, failure or unwillingness" to learn appellate rules will result in
the imposition of appropriate sanctions.2 5 Several other circuits have
dismissed an appeal as a sanction for noncompliance with local court
rules and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.26 In many in-
stances, however, the dismissal was only conditional, in that the errant
attorneys were given an opportunity to correct the deficiencies of their
briefs.27
claims or parties or upon a determination by the district court that there is
no just reason for delay coupled with an express direction for the entry of
judgment as to one or more but less than all of the claims or parties. Id. at
407. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Comment, Appeal-
ability and Finality in the Third Circuit - Is the United States Supreme Court
More Appealing Than the Third Circuit, 25 VILL, L. REv. 884, 886-95, 910-12
(1980).
23. 552 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1977). In Somers, counsel for the appellant
had failed to include in the appendix documents and transcripts which the
court deemed necessary to a proper disposition of the issues in the case before
it. Id. at 114. The court was forced to obtain these documents through its
own efforts. Id.
24. Id. at 115. The Somers court stated that, although it had hesitated
to impose sanctions for failure to comply with appellate rules in the past, it
must do so in the future since the court can no longer afford the time and
effort necessary to prepare counsels' case and to supply counsels' record
deficiencies. Id.
25. Id. at 115, citing 3D CIR. R. 21(3).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Kush, 579 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1978) (failure
of attorney to comply with rules requiring preparation and filing of acceptable
appendix on appeal); United States v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 517 F.2d
881 (4th Cir. 1975) (brief filed by the government purported to include an
appendix, but appendix failed to meet minimum requirements of FED. R.
APP. P. 30); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 336 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1964)
(appellant's failure to furnish specification of error in brief was in violation of
Ninth Circuit local rules).
27. See United States v. Kush, 579 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1978) (dismissal for
violation of FED. R. APP. P. 30 would be vacated if counsel filed a proper
appendix by a specified date); Alnajjar v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 6 (6th Cir.
1975) (dismissal conditional on failure to correct deficiencies within specified
time); Walters v. Shari Music Co., 298 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1962) (appeal would be
dismissed unless appellant, within specified time, filed new printed appendix
conforming to rule).
Although these cases indicate that some circuits are beginning to enforce
their appellate rules strictly, other circuit have discarded the appendix require-
ment altogether. See 5TH CIR. R. 13 (appeals from district courts and Tax
Court, and petitions for review of orders of an administrative agency, shall be
on the original record "without requirement of the appendix prescribed by
F.R.A.P. 30"). For examples of other rules which abandon the appendix re-
quirement, see 8TH CIR. R. ll(A)(1); 9Tr CIR. R. 4(B).
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The court in Kushner acknowledged that, in dismissing the appeal,
it was setting precedent within the circuit.28 To justify its holding,
the court observed that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are
the product of much careful thought and must be carefully observed if
an appeal is to be considered in an appropriate manner.2 9 The court
emphasized that the caseload which Third Circuit judges must handle
is increasing 80 and, thus, that the court could no longer afford to spend
extremely valuable time trying to obtain vital information which coun-
sel had negligently or deliberately omitted from the appendix.8 1
The Kushner court took pains to point out that the apparent in-
justice or hardship suffered by an appellant, whose appeal was dismissed
under Third Circuit Rule 21(3), is mitigated by his ability to bring a
malpractice action against his attorney.32 The court also pointed out
that, in the case before it, the appellants would have a second oppor-
tunity to appeal after final judgment was entered in the district court.83
In light of the treatment given this area of the law in other circuits
which have dismissed appeals for failure to comply with procedural
rules 84 and the warning which the Third Circuit had previously given
in Somers,35 it is submitted that the Kushner court was justified in
28. 620 F.2d at 407. The Third Circuit noted that it was not only set-
ting precedent, but also giving fair warning to all concerned that cases similar
to this one, in which counsel fails to abide by the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Third Circuit rules, may also result in dismissal. Id.
29. Id. at 406. The court, in keeping with what it felt to be the policy
of the rules, recognized that there are competing interests which must be bal-
anced. Id. The court identified the competing interests as the harm caused
to parties whose appeal is dismissed because of counsel's failure to follow the
rules and the disservice caused to litigants represented by assiduous counsel
when the court spends excessive amounts of time on poorly prepared briefs.
Id.
30. Id. The court observed that its jurisdiction includes three states and
one territory with a combined population of over 18 million. Id. While the
number of appeals over the last 20 years had more than quintupled, the num-
ber of judges had only increased from seven to nine. Id. This case load
exceeds a recent study's recommended assignment per judge by 22%. Id. at
406 n.3, citing P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, JUsTcE ON AP-
PEAL 196 (1976).
31. 620 F.2d at 407. Aside from these practical reasons for dismissing these
appeals, the court indicated that there is "jurisprudential" justification for its
decision. Id. To raise an appeal, the appellant must necessarily allege that
the district court broke some rule of substantive or procedural law. Id. It
is not, therefore, unjust or unfair to require the appellant to comply with the
appellate rules when he applies for relief. Id. The court remarked that
"sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." Id.
32. Id. at 408. See Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12
VAND. L. REv. 755 (1959); notes 37-38 and accompanying text infra.
33. 620 F.2d at 407. The Appellant's opportunity for a subsequent ap-
peal results from the court's alternative holding that the order appealed from
was not a final judgment nor otherwise appealable. See note 22 supra.
34. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
35. For a discussion of Somers, see notes 23-25 and accompanying text
supra.
[VOL. 26: p. 699
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imposing a sanction as severe as dismissal of the appeal. There is, how-
ever, a substantial likelihood that unconditional dismissals will in fact
work undue hardships on appellants in other cases.8 6 The court cava-
lierly suggests a malpractice action as a remedy for such a dismissal,37
but nowhere in its opinion does the court suggest that litigants have
availed themselves of this option, nor does the court take cognizance
of the difficulties encountered by litigants in bringing malpractice ac-
tions against their attorneys.38 Because the appellants in Kushner will
have a second opportunity to appeal, an opportunity created by the
procedural posture of the case,3 9 the court may not have felt that the
parties would be too severely penalized for the error of their attorney.
It is submitted, however, that the deterrent to shoddy advocacy obvi-
ously sought by the court, as well as the broader interest of orderly judi-
cial administration, might have been more effectively advanced had the
court more fully articulated its appreciation of the competing concerns
and stated definitively its resolve to uniformly enforce its rules in the
future through the use of the other sanctions available to it.40
While it is conceded that the practical reasons advanced by the
Third Circuit for enforcing its procedural rules with strong sanctions 41
are legitimate, it is suggested that the court might be better advised to
follow the practice in other circuits of making the dismissal only con-
ditional.42 Such a procedure would both effectively counteract attor-
neys' apparent indifference to appellate procedure rules and protect their
client's interests since the attorneys would know that a shoddy brief or
36. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text infra.
37. 620 F.2d at 408.
38. See text accompanying note 32 supra. The court in Kushner simply
states that this option is available to those who wish to proceed against their
attorneys. 620 F.2d at 408. It is submitted, however, that this solution may
not sufficiently protect the client's interests as his task in attempting to re-
cover in a negligence action is a formidable one. Wade, supra note 32, at 774.
In an action against their attorney, the appellants in Kushner would be re-
quired to win two cases: They would have to show both that the attorney was
negligent; and that they were entitled to win in the Kushner suit, and would
have won, but for their attorney's negligence. Id. It is also suggested that the
additional time required and the expenses incurred in waging a malpractice
action, even if it were successful, are additional reasons why the court should
reconsider dismissal of the case as the solution to the problems which it faces.
39. See note 22 supra; text accompanying note 33 supra.
40. 620 F.2d at 407. The Kushner court acknowledged that it was setting
precedent upon which the court could rely in future cases of similar nature.
Id. It is submitted, however, that the court failed to consider the impact of
such precedent in cases where the parties may not have the procedural "out"
that existed in Kushner. In this respect, the court's decision skirted the prob-
lems which a dismissed party would have where its only alternative would be
an action for malpractice against his attorney. See notes 37-38 and accom-
panying text supra. For a discussion of the other alternatives open to the
court, see notes 41-43 and accompanying text infra.
41. For a discussion of the practical problems which the court faces, see
notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra.
42. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
1980-81]
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appendix would have to be redone. It is further suggested that where
an attorney's conduct in handling a client's affairs is professionally in-
adequate or incompetent, the court might recommend, and the State
Bar authority might impose, appropriate professional discipline aimed
at discouraging such conduct.4 3 Consequently, it is submitted that the
sanction of unconditional dismissal of an appeal should be reserved
only for cases of the most egregious non-compliance with the Court's
rules but that Kushner should serve as a stern warning of the Third
Circuit's insistence upon correct and timely compliance with its rules
of procedure.
Peter D. Holbrook
43. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CANON 6; EC 6-1 &
6-2, DR 6-101(A)(2) ("A lawyer shall not . . . handle a legal matter without
preparation adequate in the circumstances"). See also ABA MODEL RuLs OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.1 & Comment (Discussion Draft, January 30, 1980).
In a number of cases it has been held that where an attorney has been negli-
.gent or inattentive, or has exhibited a lack of professional competence in the
handling of his client's affairs, he has violated the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, thereby warranting the imposition of disciplinary action, the
extent of which depends upon the particular facts of the situation. See, e.g.,
In re Hudson, 218 Kan. 216, 542 P.2d 181 (1975) (attorney violated Code of
Professional Responsibility and indefinite suspension was warranted where
attorney failed to handle matter and permitted default judgment to be entered
against client); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Demyan, 278 Md. App. 240,
363 A.2d 966 (1976) (negligent failure to ensure execution of certain deeds
to client, to acknowledge receipt of client's check, to deposit same in bank
account and to properly account for those funds constitute violations of Code
of Professional Responsibility warranting reprimand); Florida Bar v. Provost,
323 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1975) (attorney breached ethical duties by negligently
failing to represent and protect the interests of his clients).
[VOL. 26: p. 699
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FEDERAL COURTS - MANIFEST INJUSTICE EXCEPTION - USED TO
DENY RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE 1978 AMENDMENTS TO THE
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA).
Sikora v. American Can Co. (1980)
The plaintiffs,' employees of American Can Co. (American Can),
claimed that their employer's pension plan discriminated against em-
ployees aged fifty-five. 2 American Can's pension plan provided for
early retirement of employees between the ages of fifty-five and sixty-
five, at the option of either the employee or the company.3 Pensions
were based upon the employee's salary, contributions,' and years of
service.4 Pursuant to the terms of the plan, American Can retired the
plaintiffs - Honeiser, age fifty-six, in 1976; and Kalmbach, age sixty-
one, in 1975.5
The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey claiming that their retirements were involun-
tary 6 and that such retirements prior to the age of sixty-five were violative
of the ADEA.7 In response to the plaintiffs' claims for damages and
1. Sikora v. American Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1980). In the original
suit, the four plaintiffs, John Sikora, Otto Kalmbach, Frederick Meyer and
Vladimir Honeiser, alleged violations of the ADEA. Id. at 1118. Sikora settled
his case after the appeal was taken and Meyer's claim was dismissed by stipu-
lation, thus leaving Kalmbach and Honeiser with claims against American Can.
Id. at 1119. American Can employed Honeiser on March 16, 1964 and Kalm-
bach on December 3, 1962. Id. at 1118.
2. Id. at 1116. American Can is a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the State of New Jersey and authorized to do business in New
Jersey. Id.
3. Id. at 1118. A 1974 change in the plan provided a formula for early
retirement at the option of either the company or the employee. Id. Under
the plan, an employee's pension could be reduced by one-fourth of one percent
for each month that his early retirement came before age 65, unless the employee
had completed 30 years of accredited service and was age 55. Id.
4. Id. American Can's voluntary retirement plan was created on July 1,
1969 and extended to regular full-time, salaried employees except for those em-
ployees covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Id. In January 1972,
employee contributions were eliminated and the pensions were based upon
years of service and salary. Id.
5. Id. Plaintiff Honeiser had been working for American Can for 12 years
and upon the date of his involuntary retirement he became eligible for a pension
of $194.92 per month for life. Id. He had been previously earning $1,706 per
month. Id. Plaintiff Kalmbach was employed by the defendant for 13 years
and was pensioned at $215.91 per month. Id. He had been earning $1,511 per
month before his involuntary retirement. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The plaintiffs were claiming a violation of the ADEA which reads
in pertinent part:
Section 4(a). It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any, individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
(705)
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reinstatement,8 American Can moved for summary judgment, maintain-
ing that their "bona fide" retirement plan made the otherwise involun-
tary retirements fall outside the conduct proscribed by the ADEA. 9
The district court granted summary judgment on the retirement
claims holding that an involuntary retirement pursuant to a bona fide
pension plan was not violative of the 1967 ADEA.10 Judgment was
entered on March 20, 1978.11 On April 6, 1978, the same day that the
plaintiffs appealed the lower court decision,' 2 Congress amended the
1967 ADEA, making it unlawful to involuntarily retire an individual
on the basis of the age of the employee, including retirements pursuant
to a bona fide pension plan.'3  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply
with this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976).
8. 622 F.2d at 1118. The plaintiffs also amended their complaint to include
age discrimination allegations relating to merit and salary increases. Id. at 1119.
9. Id. at 11118-19. American Can pointed to § 623(0(2) of the 1967 ADEA
which read in pertinent part:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or
labor organization -
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona
fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter,
except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to
.hire any individual.
29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1976) (amended 1978). For the text of the section as
amended, see note 13 infra.
10. 622 F.2d at 1119. The district judge found the Third Circuit's decision
in Zinger v. Blanchette to be controlling. Id., citing Zinger v. Blanchette, 549
F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978). In Zinger, the Third
Circuit had held that the involuntary retirement of a 64-year-old railroad em-
ployee was not violative of the 1967 ADEA. 549 F.2d at 910. The court held
that under the Act, forced early retirement pursuant to a reasonable and bona
fide retirement plan was lawful. 622 F.2d at 1119.
11. 622 F.2d at 1119.
12. Id. The plaintiffs' first appeal was dismissed for failure to comply with
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 622 F.2d at 1119.
13. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (Supp. II 1978). The 1967 ADEA was amended in
1978, and now provides in pertinent part:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or
labor organization -
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona
fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter,
except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to
[VOL. 26: p. 705
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the 1978 amendments to the ADEA should be applied in this case
even though the disputed retirements occurred prior to the effective
date of the amendments. 14
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 15 va-
cated the judgment of the district court,16 holding that the 1978 ADEA
amendments do not apply retroactively to involuntary retirements which
occurred prior to the effective date of the amendments: Sikora v. Ameri-
can Can Co., 622 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir. 1980).
In 1967, Congress enacted the ADEA with the intention of promot-
ing employment of the elderly based upon their ability rather than
their age: by prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination in employment,
it was expected that employers and employees would then be able to
confront and resolve many of the problems of age and its impact upon
employment.17 To achieve these purposes, the ADEA provided that
an employer's "fail[ure] or refu[sal] to hire or discharge any individual
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his...
hire any individual, and no such seniority system or employee benefit
plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any indi-
vidual specified by section 631(a) of this title because of the age of such
individual.
Id. For the text of the section as it was prior to the amendment, see note 9
supra.
14. 622 F.2d at 119.
15. The case was heard by Judges Adams, Rosenn, and Weis. Judge Weis
wrote the opinion of the court. Judge Adams filed a dissenting opinion.
16. 622 F.2d at 1124. The case was remanded to the district court for a
determination of whether American Can's pension plan was bona fide and not a
subterfuge. Id. The district court, on remand, was also to resolve the plaintiffs'
claims of discrimination in denying raises. Id.
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)-(b) (1976). The statement of findings and pur-
pose reads as follows:
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that -
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment,
and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise de-
sirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemploy-
ment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer ac-
ceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among older workers;
their numbers are great and growing; and their employment problems
are grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary dis-
crimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the
free flow of goods in commerce.
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this Chapter to promote employment
of older persons based on their ability rather than age: to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age
on employment.
1980-811
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age" shall be unlawful.' s Further, the Act originally provided that
involuntary retirements pursuant to a bona fide pension plan would
not be unlawful. 19
The Supreme Court, in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann,20 in-
terpreted the "bona fide pension plan" language to constitute an excep-
tion to the 1967 Act.21 Thus, when a bona fide pension plan is shown
not to be a subterfuge for the avoidance of obligations imposed by the
Act, the courts had held that retirements pursuant to such plans were
valid. 22 Following the McMann decision, Congress amended the 1967
ADEA to expressly strengthen and broaden the Act and forced retire-
ments, even though previously allowed under a bona fide pension plan,
were precluded.23
A clear bias against the retroactive application of statutes and laws
has existed since the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court.24 In the
1798 case of Calder v. Bull,25 the Supreme Court recognized that, gen-
erally, laws should not be given retroactive effect because of the unjust
and often oppressive consequences resulting from such application. 2
18. Id. § 623(a)(1) (1976).
19. Id. § 623(f)(2) (amended 1978).
20. 434 U.S. 192 (1977). In United Air Lines, the plaintiff, an employee
of United Airlines, was retired at age 60 in accordance with the provisions of
the company's pension plan. Id. at 193-94. The plaintiff claimed that the re-
tirement was involuntary and violated the 1967 ADEA. Id. at 194.
21. Id. at 202. The Court held that such retirements, if pursuant to a
bona fide pension plan, are not unlawful under § 623(f)(2). Id. Accord Zinger
v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
In Zinger, the court stated that, under the Act, "involuntary retirement pur-
suant to a bona fide plan which is not a subterfuge . . .is not unlawful." 549
F.2d at 910. For a further discussion of Zinger, see note 10 supra.
22. See e.g., Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1008 (1978); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.
1974).
23. 29 U.S.C., § 623(f)(2) (Supp. 11 1978). For the text of the amendment,
see note 13 and accompanying text supra. As stated in the amendment's legis-
lative history, "[t]he primary purpose of this legislation is to strengthen and
broaden the provisions of the ADEA to insure that older individuals who desire
to work will not be denied employment opportunities solely on the basis of
age." S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. 8c AD. NEWS 504, 504.
24. See generally Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A
Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936).
25. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
26. Id. at 391. In Calder, the Supreme Court rejected an ex post facto
challenge to a Connecticut statute. Id. at 386. The 1795 statute allowed a new
hearing to be granted to a 1793 cause of action which, under an older statute,
had lost all right of appeal. Id. at 386-87. Although the Court held that there
was no ex post facto problem because the action involved no vested rights, it
noted that "it is a good general rule, that a law should have no retrospect."
Id. at 391 (emphasis by the Court). As the Calder Court noted, "Laws made to
punish for actions done before the existence of such laws, and which have not
been declared crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive, and inconsistent
with the fundamental principles of a free government." Id. at 396, citing MAss.
CoNsT. art. 24.
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Thus, absent a clear expression by the legislature to the contrary, a
statute is presumed to have prospective effect only.27
However, the Court has recognized a special type of retroactivity
which requires the application of a change in the law to cases pending
on appeal.28 This "special" type of retroactivity was first expressed in
United States v. The Schooner Peggy 29 where the Court retroactively
applied a treaty which was enacted in 1800 while the litigation was
pending.30 The Circuit Court had condemned a French ship pursuant
to a federal statute, but the Supreme Court reversed on the basis of the
treaty language which provided for mutual restoration of captured
property which had not yet been definitely condemned.3' The Schooner
Peggy Court reasoned that the treaty should be applied retroactively
because when "subsequent to the judgment and before the decision
of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule
which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied." 32
The Court did urge, however, that retroactive application be granted
more readily to cases involving great national concerns than to those
involving private parties.83
27. See Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 337 (1930); Waugh v. Board of
Trustees, 237 U.S. 589, 595 (1915); United States v. American Sugar Refining
Co., 202 U.S. 563, 577 (1906); United States v. Heath, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399
(1806).
28. See notes 29-52 and accompanying text infra.
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
30. Id. at 110. On April 24, 1800, a United States ship, following instruc-
tions to seize any French vessel found in American territorial waters, captured
the French vessel, Schooner Peggy. Id. at 103. The vessel was condemned as a
"prize" on September 23, 1800. Id. at 107. On February 18, 1801, a treaty
was ratified between France and the United States providing for mutual restora-
tion of captured property not yet definitively condemned. Id. at 107. The
Court noted that the lower court's condemnation was not definitive because the
decision was appealed and thus the controversy was still pending. Id. at 109.
The Court held that the treaty applied retroactively to the vessel and that it
should be returned. Id. at 110.
31. Id. at 110.
32. Id.
33. Id. The Schooner Peggy Court specifically stated that, "[Ilt is true
that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle
hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the
rights of parties ....... Id.
The principles of Schooner Peggy were reaffirmed by the Court in Thorpe
v. Housing Auth., where the Court reiterated the general rule that "an appellate
court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision." 393 U.S.
268, 281 (1969) (footnotes omitted). Further, the Court held that the rule ex-
tended to constitutional and judicial changes as well as to statutory changes of
the law. Id. at 282.
See also United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602, 604 (1960) (per curiam)
(applying Civil Rights Act of 1960 to a case pending on appeal; the Act created
a cause of action against the state); Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 78
(1943) (applying Interstate Commerce Act amendment to pending permit ap-
plication); Carpenter v. Wabash Ry., 309 U.S. 23, 26-29 (1940) (applying the
Bankruptcy Act amendment which specified that it was to apply to pending
cases); Dinsmore v. Southern Express Co., 183 U.S. 115, 119-21 (1901) (amend-
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The Court, in Bradley v. Richmond School Board,34 ruled that
legislation which was enacted while an appeal in the case was pending
was properly applied to that case.8 5 In Bradley, the district court had
awarded attorneys fees to plaintiffs who had successfully sued for de-
segregation of a Virginia school district.3 At the time of the district
court's decision there existed no statutory basis for the court's award
of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs.8 7 During an appeal by the school
district, but before the appellate decision, Congress enacted legislation
providing federal courts with the power to award reasonable attorney's
fees. 8s The Supreme Court allowed retroactive application of the new
legislation, 9 but stated that statutes should not be given retroactive
effect where there was statutory language or legislative history to the
contrary 40 or where retroactive application would result in manifest
injustice to one of the parties.4' The Bradley Court suggested that
three considerations were appropriate in determining the presence or
absence of manifest injustice: 42 the nature and identity of the parties;
the nature of their rights; and the nature of the impact of the change
ment to War Revenue Act of 1898 used to dismiss suit brought under the Act);
Note, Statutory Authorization for Awarding of Attorneys' Fees Applied Retro-
actively to Services Rendered Prior to Its Enactment, Despite an Absence of
Language on Legislative Hitory Indicating it Was to be Applied to Pending
Cases, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 435, 439 (1975).
34. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
35. Id. at 724.
36. Id. at 705-06.
37. Id. at 709, citing Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 330-31
(4th Cir. 1972).
38. 416 U.S. at 709. See 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1970 ed. Supp. II) (Education
Amendments Act of 1972).
39. 416 U.S. at 711. The Court noted that the origin and justification of
the rule can be found in Schooner Peggy, where Chief Justice Marshall advo-
cated retroactive application of changed law to cases on appeal. Id. at 711-12.
Specifically, the Court found that the parties in Bradley, a publicly funded
governmental entity and a class of children, were involved with a matter of
great national concern in the form of school desegregation litigation. Id. at
718-19. The Bradley Court found no matured rights in that the school board
was always subject to instructions from the public. Id. at 720. Also, the Court
noted that no increased burden was placed upon the school board since it was
already constitutionally responsible for providing pupils with a non-discrimina-
tory education. Id. at 721.
40. Id. at 712.
41. Id. at 711. Relying on the decisions of Schooner Peggy and Thorpe
v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969), the Bradley Court arrived at three criteria
upon which to base a finding of manifest injustice. 416 U.S. at 716-17. For a
discussion of these criteria, see notes 42-43 and accompanying text infra.
42. 416 U.S. at 717. As the Court stated:
The concerns expressed by the Court in Schooner Peggy and in Thorpe
relative to the possible working of an injustice center upon (a) the
nature and identity of the parties, (b) the nature of their rights, and
(c) the nature of the impact of the change in law upon these rights.
[VOL. 26: p. 705
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss3/7
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
on those rights.43 The first of the set, the nature and identity of the
parties, relates back to the Schooner Peggy preference for applicability
of recent legislation to areas of great national concern and not in cases
between private individuals.4 4 The second and third considerations
evolve from the Court's unwillingness to infringe upon mature rights 45
or impose unanticipated obligations upon the parties.4 6
In Greene v. United States,47 retroactive application of a 1960 De-
partment of Defense regulation to the plaintiff was denied because the
plaintiffs' rights were deemed to have vested as a result of a 1959 Su-
preme Court decision.48 The 1959 decision had held that Greene's
security clearance had been wrongfully revoked, 49 and Greene subse-
43. Id. In applying the three criteria, the Court noted that a dispute be-
tween a publicly funded government entity and a class of children was not one
between private individuals but rather constituted a great national concern.
Id. at 718-19. Further, the Bradley Court found no matured or unconditional
rights affected by retroactive application. Id. at 720. As to the third con-
cern, the Court found no impact on the parties' rights since retroactive ap-
plication of § 718 did not alter the school board's constitutional responsibility
or providing pupils with a nondiscriminatory education. Id. at 721. Accord-
ingly, from these circumstances, the Bradley Court held that applying §718
retroactively would not result in manifest injustice. Id.
44. Id. at 719. For a discussion of Schooner Peggy, see notes 29-33 and
accompanying text supra.
45. 416 U.S. at 720. The Bradley Court noted concern over the possibility
of injustice arising from retroactive application of changed law to a right that
has matured or vested. Id. Generally, statutes will not be given retrospective
operation if to do so would impair or disturb vested rights. See note 47
infra. The normal sense of the word "vest" is to indicate a present and im-
mediate interest as distinguished from one which is contingent. 92 C.J.S.
Vest (1955). Thus, a major obstacle to retroactive application is presence of
a vested right. 416 U.S. at 720.
46. 416 U.S. at 720. The Court declared it would avoid retroactive ap-
plication due to unfairness if such application would have the impact of
creating new and unanticipated obligations. Id.
47. 376 U.S. 149 (1964). Greene was cited by the Court in Bradley during
its discussion of "the nature of the rights affected by the change." Bradley v.
Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. at 720. According to the Bradley Court, Greene
was an example of the courts' refusal to "apply an intervening change to a
pending action where it has concluded that to do so would infringe upon or
deprive a person of a right that had matured or become unconditional." Id.
Greene involved a controversy over the 1953 discharge of the plaintiff,
an employee in a munitions company, due to revocation of his security clear-
ance. 376 U.S. at 150. The Supreme Court, in 1959, held that the discharge
was unlawful since neither the right to confrontation nor cross-examination had
been granted to the plaintiff. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959).
After the loss of his job, the plaintiff had taken a lower paying job and
had sued for the difference in salaries under a 1955 Department of Defense
regulation allowing reimbursement of employees who had received a final de-
termination of their contract rights. 376 U.S. at 151-52 & n.3. The Depart-
ment refused to grant the request under the 1955 regulation but claimed that
a new 1960 regulation, which required proof by the employee that he would
presently be entitled to a security clearance, applied. Id. at 152-53.
48. See 376 U.S. at 153, 164.
49. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). For a discussion of McElroy,
see note 47 supra.
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quently applied to the Department of Defense for reimbursement under
a 1955 regulation.5" The Department, however, wanted to apply a
1960 regulation which would require the applicant to prove he would
now be eligible for a security clearance. 51 The Supreme Court held
that the earlier decision as to Greene's right to reimbursement had vested
and matured Greene's right and, thus, it refused to apply a changed
law to a case on appeal where it would affect a right which had ma-
tured and become unconditional. 52
In City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,53 the Court denied retroactive
application of an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 because of the great impact that the change in the law would have
upon the parties.54 Manhart involved an alleged sex discrimination,
in violation of Title VII, stemming from the city's pension plan which
required larger contributions from female employees than from male
employees. 55 The Court held that the impact of a retroactive award
would have a disastrous effect on the solvency of pension and insurance
plans and therefore denied retroactive application of the law.56
Against this background, Judge Weis framed the issue of the
Sikora appeal as whether the 1978 ADEA amendments should be ap-
plied retroactively to the plaintiffs' involuntary retirements. 5 7 After
noting the general rule that a statute is presumed to apply prospectively,
Judge Weis recognized that the application of a change in the sub-
50. For a brief discussion of the 1955 regulation, see note 47 supra.
51. 376 U.S. at 159. The Court, in Greene v. United States, rejected the
Department's contention that the 1960 regulation was applicable and held
that the plaintiff's rights to reimbursement had vested and matured as a result
of the earlier Greene v. McElroy decision. Id. at 160-61.
52. Id. at 164. See also Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323
U.S. 141, 164 (1944). (Court refused application of Chandler Act to a pro-
ceeding under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act where a final decree by the Tax
Court had been entered prior to the effective date of the statute).
53. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
54. Id. at 723. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1976), as amended by Pub.
L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076.
55. 435 U.S. at 704.
56. Id. at 712-22. The Court noted that over fifty million Americans used
retirement plans other than Social Security and over $600 billion were re-
served as of 1976 for retirement benefits. Id. at 722, citing AMERICAN COUNCIL
OF LIFE INSURANCE, PENSION FACrS 1977 20-23. Further, the Court stated that
the determination of the amount set aside always includes risks that the in-
surer foresees. 435 U.S. at 721. The Court reasoned that allowing a retro-
active Title VII award would create an unforeseen risk since prohibition
against sex-differentiated employee contribution was a marked departure from
past practice. Id. at 722. The Court concluded that retroactive liability
would be devastating. Id. See also Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 428
F. Supp. 454, 466-68 (D. N.J. 1971) (special sensitivity shown to retroactive
Title VII awards in pension plan area).
57. 622 F.2d at 119. For a discussion of the 1967 ADEA and the 1978
amendments to the Act, see notes 9 & 13 supra.
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stantive law to a case which is pending is an execption to this rule.58
In order to determine whether the exception for pending cases should
be applied to the Sikora appeal, the court first examined the statutory
language and found the wording inconclusive.59 The court next con-
sidered the legislative history and found indirect support for the posi-
tion that the amendments were not to apply retroactively. 60
In considering the manifest injustice exception as it was articulated
in Bradley,61 the court noted the Supreme Court's admonition in
Schooner Peggy, that courts should struggle hard against retroactive
application with respect to private parties, 62 and observed that Sikora
was such a case.63 Looking to the nature of the parties' substantive
rights, the court found that since both parties had voluntarily entered
into the pension plan, their contractual rights, obligations and expecta-
tions should be protected.64 Judge Weis pointed to the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting65 and a Bulletin from the
Secretary of Labor,66 both interpreting the 1967 ADEA to permit in-
58. 622 F.2d at 119-20. Judge Weis traced this exception to Schooner
Peggy where Chief Justice Marshall first espoused the rule. Id. For a discus-
sion of Schooner Peggy, see notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
59. 622 F.2d at 1120. Specifically, the court noted that, by its terms,
the Act was to "take effect on the date of enactment," April 6, 1978, and
found this language to be equivocal. Id. The court recognized that the lan-
guage could prohibit involuntary retirements before age 65 after April 6,
1978. Id. Judge Weis also noted, however, the possibility that the amend-
ment served to erase conflicting provisions from existing retirement plans and
eliminate contractual language defenses. Id. Both constructions were deemed
to be plausible by the court. Id.
60. Id. at 1120-21. The court found only one reference to the issue in
legislative history. Id. In response to a question as to retroactivity from
Senator Randolph, Senator Williams responded: "The bill is not retroactive.
The question of mandatory retirements prior to the effective date of this bill
will be determined by the courts' interpretation of existing law." Id. at 8,
citing 123 CONG. REc. S17, 304 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (emphasis
added). On this basis, the court found that "the brief legislative history seems
to indicate that Congress intended a prospective application." 622 F.2d at
1121.
61. For a discussion of the Bradley criteria, see notes 42-46 and accompany-
ing text supra.
62. 622 F.2d at 1122. For a discussion of Schooner Peggy regarding suits
between private parties, see note 33 supra.
63. 622 F.2d at 1122. The court considered the present situation to deal
with a private matter which, if affected, would have no great repercussions
either internationally or nationally. Id.
64. Id. at 1122-23. For a review of the provisions of the plan, see notes
4-6 and accompanying text supra.
65. 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974). Brennan involved the compulsory retire-
ment of a 60 year old plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the defendants' re-
tirement plan. Id. at 214. There the court interpreted the 1967 ADEA to
allow forced retirement pursuant to a bona fide pension plan. Id. at 215.
66. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.110 (1979). The Secretary of Labor issued an in-
terpretive bulletin in 1969 which provides that, "the act authorizes involuntary
retirement irrespective of age, provided that such retirement is pursuant to
the terms of a retirement or pension plan." Id. In a report to Congress,
1980-81]
15
Editors: Federal Courts and Procedure
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
voluntary retirements before age 70, as evidence that the defendant's
rights had vested.6 7 The court concluded that these contractual rights
had become fixed and unconditional and that retroactive application of
the amendment would prejudice these vested rights.6 S
Concerning the impact that retroactive application would have
upon the parties' rights, Judge Weis emphasized the disastrous effects
upon the solvency of pension plans that retroactive application could
trigger.69 Fear of such a disastrous effect contributed to the court's
finding of manifest injustice. 70 Upon review of the record, Judge
Weis found that retroactive application would result in manifest injus-
tice to the employer and therefore held that the amendments did not
apply retroactively to a retirement that occurred prior to the effective
date of the enactment 71 and concluded that the presumption in favor
of retroactivity articulated in Bradley was inapplicable to the case be-
cause of the positive legislative history and the "need to prevent mani-
fest injustice." 72 Since the court was not in a position to determine
the validity of the pension plan, however, the case was remanded for a
determination of whether the plan was bona fide.73
Judge Adams filed a strong dissent challenging the validity of the
majority's interpretation and application of the Bradley criteria.7 4
Secretary of Labor Brennen stated that mandatory retirements were permis-
sible so long as they were part of a bona fide pension plan. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, REPORT PERTAINING TO ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION
WITH THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967 17 (January
1975).
67. 622 F.2d at 1123. Judge Weis stressed that, to the extent that the
defendants had the contractual option to retire its employees under both the
Bulletin and the Brennan decision, its rights and obligations were fixed by
1975 and 1976 when they retired the plaintiffs. Id. The plaintiffs, Judge
Weis noted, had no firmly established right to remain employed until they
reached age 65. Id.
68. 622 F.2d at 1123. The Court considered the retirement plan a con-
tract that was in prima facie compliance with the law when the retirement oc-
curred. Id.
69. Id. at 1123. The Court stated: "Consequently, the rules that apply to
these funds should not be applied retroactively unless the legislature has
plainly commanded that result." Id., quoting City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,
435 U.S. at 721. For a discussion of Manhart, see notes 53-56 and accompany-
ing text supra.
70. 622 F.2d at 1123.
71. Id. at 1123-24.
72. Ibid. Although the court found only one reference to retroactivity in
the legislative history, it concluded that there did exist a "positive legislative
history" against retroactive application. Id. See note 60 and accompanying
text supra.
73. 622 F.2d at 1124. The case was remanded for a determination of
whether the age limits for early retirements were too low and the pensions
inadequate. Id. The necessity to remand was due to the fact that the district
court had included no factual basis in the record for its determination that the
pension plan was bona fide. Id.
74. Id. at 1124-35 (Adams, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the criteria
as developed in Bradley and applied by this court, see notes 42-46 & 61-73
and accompanying text supra.
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Judge Adams agreed that "for cases pending .. .at the time the law
is changed, the [Supreme] [C]ourt appears to have abandoned the
presumption of prospectivity, adopt[ing] instead a rule of presumed
retroactivity . . ." subject to a scrutiny of the legislative history, statu-
tory direction, and the manifest injustice exception to the rule.7 5
Under Judge Adams' analysis, Congress had not shown a clear
intention to limit the amendments to prospective application only.76
Judge Adams also argued that careful scrutiny failed to reveal con-
clusively that retroactive application would result in manifest injustice
to the parties or their rights. 7 In support of this conclusion, Judge
Adams argued that the private status of the parties, although a cri-
terion involved in the determination of manifest injustice, should not
have been given such critical significance by the majority.7 8 Such a
construction, he argued, would constrict the retroactive rule, making it
applicable to only a few public law cases. 79 Considering the nature
and identity of the parties, Judge Adams, unlike the majority, argued
that this case involved a great national concern,8 0 comparable to the
issue considered in Schooner Peggy.s' In addition, he found that the
parties' rights had not been fixed and unconditional at the time of the
retirement82 because the 1967 Act had not been conclusively inter-
75. 622 F.2d at 1127 (Adams, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 1129 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams found the brief
legislative history to fall "short of a 'clear legislative direction' that [the] law
have only a prospective effect . . ." which he felt was required under Thorpe
v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969), and Bradley. Id. For a discussion of
the legislative history, see note 60 supra. For a discussion of Thorpe and
Bradley, see notes 33-46 and accompanying text supra.
77. 622 F.2d at 1135 (Adams, J., dissenting). Since the legislative history
and congressional direction were inconclusive, Judge Adams accordingly turned
his attention to the presence or absence of manifest injustice. Id. at 1129-35
(Adams, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1129-31 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams argued that by
allowing private status such a significant role, a limitation was created which
would be inconsistent with the broad language of Thorpe v. Housing Auth.,
393 U.S. 268 (1969), and Bradley. Id. For a discussion of Thorpe, see note
33 supra.
79. 622 F.2d at 1130 (Adams, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1130-31 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams ascertained that
the legislative history of the Act indicated that a great national concern was
involved. Id. From examination of the House and Senate Reports, Judge
Adams characterized the Act as a remedy to a "problem on a par with racial
and sexual discrimination-matters of concededly great national importance."
Id., citing H.R. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977); S. REP. No.
95-493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
81. For a discussion of Schooner Peggy, see notes 29-33 and accompanying
text supra.
82. 622 F.2d at 1131-32 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams maintained
that there was no basis to be found for the vesting and maturing of the de-
fendants' rights. Id. For a discussion of the majority's assertions that the
parties rights had vested, see notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra.
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preted at that time.88 Thus, Judge Adams concluded that manifest
injustice would not result from a retroactive application of the amend-
ment and that the general rule allowing application of changed law to
pending cases should be followed.84
It is submitted that the dissent's criticism concerning the court's
finding of manifest injustice is valid. 5 Although the majority stated
that the legislative history seems to indicate that Congress intended only
prospective application, it also correctly observed that neither the legis-
lative history nor the statutory direction provide a clear directive as to
congressional intent.86 It is submitted, therefore, that the actual basis
of the majority's opinion was the finding of manifest injustice.8 7 While
the court correctly recognized the general rule that when the revelant
law is changed while a case is on appeal the new law is to be applied,SS
it is suggested that the court avoided such application by an erroneous
finding of manifest injustice.
83. 622 F.2d at 1132 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams observed that
only a decision by the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit or the District of
New Jersey could supply any basis upon which American Can could have
relied to vest and mature their rights. Id. Judge Adams believed that since
the retirements in this case took place within the Third Circuit, American
Can's right to retire the plaintiffs could not mature because of a decision of
a sister Court of Appeals. Id., citing Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416
U.S. at 720. Judge Adams noted that the defendant had not pleaded reliance
on the Secretary of Labor's interpretive bulletin. 622 F.2d at 1132 (Adams,
J., dissenting).
84. 622 F.2d at 1135 (Adams, J., dissenting).
85. See 622 F.2d at 1124-35 (Adams, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
the dissent's criticism, see notes 75-84 and accompanying text supra.
86. 622 F.2d at 1120-22. Although the majority found some indication that
Congress intended a prospective application, the court stated that "the statutory
language is not determinative" and that the brief legislative history only
"seems to indicate that Congress intended a prospective application." Id. at
1122 (emphasis added). See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
87. 622 F.2d at 1123. Although the court did find some legislative history
which supported its position, it is submitted that it was neither definitive nor
precise enough for the court to base its decision upon the legislative history
alone. Id. See note 60 and accompanying text supra. The need to prevent
manifest injustice was the lengthier, more involved issue on which the court
based its decision. See 622 F.2d at 1122-24.
88. 622 F.2d at 1119-20. It is submitted that although no formal rationale
has ever been advanced for use of the Schooner Peggy principle, it has been
used continuously to achieve uniformity and reliability in the federal courts.
The Supreme Court has rejected application of the rule that appellate courts
should review a judgment only to determine whether it was correct when made.
See Vandenbark v .Owens-Illinois Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1940). The Vanden-
bark Court, instead, applied the Schooner Peggy principle as the guide for
federal review noting that although Justice Marshall had dealt there with a
treaty and its relation to private parties, the principle has found acceptance in
a variety of situations. Id. at 543. See, e.g., Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Okla-
homa Gas Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1939); Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276
U.S. 238 (1927); Moores v. National Bank, 104 U.S. 625 (1881); Kibbe v. Ditto,
93 U.S. 674 (1976).
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The court, it is submitted, overly emphasized and relied upon the
status of the plaintiffs and the defendant as private entities. 89 Although
the Supreme Court in Schooner Peggy did urge courts to struggle hard
against retroactive application when the situation involves a private
case between individuals, 90 the opinion did not state that private indi-
vidual status conclusively barred retroactive application. 91 Moreover,
the majority failed to recognize that age discrimination is an issue of
great national concern.92 The dissent more aptly regarded the issue
as one akin to racial and sexual discrimination and of "profound na-
tional importance." 93
It is further submitted that the majority's position that the defend-
ant had two interpretive rulings upon which to rely 94 fails to support
the finding that the defendants' rights had vested or matured. As
the dissent noted, only a final decision by the Supreme Court, the Third
Circuit, or the District Court for the District of New Jersey could
definitely vest and mature American Can's rights and obligations. 95
Regarding the majority's argument that the solvency of pension
plans must be protected, it is submitted that the opinion failed to
reveal how invalidating a clause in a pension plan which concerned
involuntary retirements amounts to the drastic change in pension plans
89. For a discussion of the majority's view as to the nature of the parties,
see notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
90. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
91. Id.
92. As stated in the ADEA's legislative history: "Society as a whole suffers
from mandatory retirement. In hearings before the House Select Committee
on Aging, Professor James Schultz ... testified that mandatory retirement of
willing and able employees costs the nation three-tenths of 1 percent of its
annual gross national product. This represents 4.5 billion .. . dollars." S.
REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. 8c
AD. NEWS 504, 507.
It was also noted in the legislative history of the Act that: "Mandatory
retirement works severe injustices against the aged. For many, retirement in-
come from public or private sources is unavailable or inadequate to support
a comfortable existence . . . . Substantial evidence exists that mandatory
retirement may have a severe deteriorative impact on the physical and psycho-
logical health of older individuals." Id. at 3-4, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 504, 506-07.
93. 622 F.2d at 1131 (Adams, J., dissenting). See generally, Comment,
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 85 (1979).
94. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text supra.
95. See 622 F.2d at 1132 (Adams, J., dissenting); notes 82 & 83 supra. The
vesting of rights in Greene v. United States was brought about by a Supreme
Court decision. 376 U.S. at 160-61. In Sikora, the Supreme Court, Third
Circuit, or the District Court for the District of New Jersey might have ren-
dered a decision contrary to that of the Fifth Circuit's Brennan decision and
American Can would have then been bound by that decision. See notes 82 &
83 supra. Only a decision by one of those authorities could have conclusively
bound and vested American Can's right thus barring retroactive application.
For a discussion of vesting, see note 45 supra.
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cautioned against in Manhart.96 It is submitted that the majority
applied the manifest injustice execption in a way that unnecessarily
limited the presumption of retroactivity pronounced in Schooner Peggy
and Bradley.O1
It is suggested that the decision in Sikora will have a very narrow-
ing effect on retroactive application of changed law to cases pending
in the Third Circuit. It is submitted that the court's finding of mani-
fest injustice extended the exception beyond the scope intended by the
Supreme Court.9 8 This decision, it is suggested, could have been used
to enforce a broad compliance with the Schooner Peggy principle 99
as did the Supreme Court in Bradley.10°
96. For a discussion of Manhart, see notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra.
In Manhart, the court denied retroactive application of a Title VII amend-
ment to avoid drastic changes in pension plans. 435 U.S. at 702. However,
the Manhart Court based its decision in part upon sensitivity shown by other
courts to the actual and proven danger of retroactive Title VII awards in the
pension fields. Id. at 722. It is submitted that the majority in the Sikora
case identified no specific, actual danger to pension plans which would result
from retroactive application of this ADEA amendment. 622 F.2d at 1123.
It is also submitted that the major threat to pension plans results from unfore-
seen risks that insurance companies failed to incorporate in their calculations.
For the perceived risks noted in Manhart, see note 56 supra. In Manhart the
Court recognized a marked departure from standard practices. 435 U.S. at
722. In Sikora, the ADEA of 1967 was admittedly a statute not open to con-
struction and thus there were no certainties as to its content. The risks, it is
submitted, were foreseeable.
97. For a discussion of Schooner Peggy and Bradley, see notes 2946 and
accompanying text supra.
98. For a discussion of the manifest injustice exception, see notes 41-56
and accompanying text supra. The majority in the Sikora case admitted that
"the precise category of cases to which the 'manifest injustice' exception ap-
plies has not been clearly defined." 622 F.2d at 1122. Yet, it is submitted
that the decision, by relying on speculative impact and overemphasis of the
parties' private status, expanded the exception, thereby limiting the Schooner
Peggy rule of retroactivity. See id.
It is also submitted that the majority, in finding manifest injustice, cir-
cumvented the actual intent of Congress to bar forced retirements under pen-
sion plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976). Although the legislative history was
inconclusive, it is suggested that the sequential acts of Congress in relation to
the amendments demonstrate a desire to allow retroactive application. The
ADEA was enacted in 1967; United Air Lines (construing ADEA as allowed
forced retirements if under a bona fide pension plan) was decided by the
Supreme Court in 1977. For a discussion of UnitedAir Lines, see notes 20-21
and accompanying text supra. Then, in 1978, Congress revised the ADEA to
specifically prohibit such retirements. 622 F.2d at 1119. Thus, it is submitted,
an inference may be drawn that Congress had intended forced retirements to
be precluded by the 1967 ADEA and that only in view of the United Air Lines
decision did it find it necessary to enact the amendments to specifically preclude
such forced retirements.
99. For a discussion of Schooner Peggy, see notes 29-33 and accompanying
text supra.
100. For a discussion of Bradley, see notes 34-46 and accompanying text
supra. See also, Note, Statutory Authorization for Awarding of Attorneys'
Fees Applied Retroactively to Services Rendered Prior to Its Enactment, Despite
an Absence of Language or Legislative History Indicating It Was to be Ap-
[VOL. 26: p. 705
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A question raised by Sikora is whether retroactive application will
generally be denied to all or most private litigation cases. If, as the
majority seems to suggest, private status is to be a laregly determinative
factor, it would as the dissent notes, "invert what the [Supreme] Court
has defined as a general rule into a limited rule applicable only to a
relatively small number of public law cases." 101 It is suggested that the
court in the present case, by denying retroactive application of the
ADEA amendments to the pending case due to a finding of manifest
injustice, restricted a developing rule which was clarified and relied
upon in Bradley.0 2
John H. McCarthy, Jr.
plied to Pending Cases, 24 DRAxE L. REv. 435 (1975). (Author recognizes
that should the Court seek to enforce a broad compliance with the Schooner
Peggy principle, it has, by Bradley, laid for itself a strong foundation for
such action).
101. See 622 F.2d at 1130 (Adams, J., dissenting).
102. See notes 34-46 and accompanying text supra.
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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW - THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS PREVAILS
OVER THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN
COMPLEX LITIGATION.
In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation (1980)
National Union Electric Corp. (NUE) and Zenith Radio Corp.
(Zenith) brought actions seeking treble damages and injunctive relief '
against competitors for an alleged conspiracy to destroy the United
States domestic consumer electronics industry in violation of federal
antitrust laws.2 Counterclaims were filed by certain defendants alleging
antitrust violations on the part of Zenith.3
1. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889,
992 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust
Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). NUE's complaint was filed in the
district of New Jersey on December 21, 1970. 478 F. Supp. at 892 n.3.
Zenith filed its complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on September
20, 1974. Id. at 892 n.4. The actions were consolidated for trial by the
Pennsylvania district court. 631 F.2d at 1073. Both the Antidumping Act of
1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), allow
for the award of treble damages.
2. 631 F.2d at 1072. The conspiracy is alleged to have lasted 30 years,
involving over 100 coconspirators. Id. The relevant statutory provisions in-
clude: 1) The Antidumping Act of 1916, which prohibits imports from being
sold in the United States "at a price substantially less than the actual market
value or wholesale price" in the countries where the goods are produced or
otherwise marketed, provided the acts are done with the intent of destroying
or injuring an industry in the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976). 2) The
Sherman Act, which makes conspiracies in restraint of trade or which attempt
a monopolization of United States commerce unlawful, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
(1976). 3) The Wilson Tariff Act, which declares as illegal and void any
conspiracy made between parties, either of whom is importing goods into the
United States, with intent to effect a restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1976).
Zenith alleged separate violations of § 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits
a company, engaged in commerce, from acquiring interests in another com-
pany, also involved in commerce, where that acquisition may substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. 631 F.2d at 1072. See 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Zenith also alleged a separate violation of the Robinson-
Patman Act, which makes it unlawful for any person engaged in commerce
to discriminate in its pricing policies or schemes for the purpose of destroying
competition. 631 F.2d at 1072. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
3. 631 F.2d at 1072-73. Zenith is accused of violating §§ I and 2 of the
Sherman Act as well as the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2,
13(a) (1976). For the pertinent provisions of these acts, see note 2 supra.
The defendants also accused Zenith of being part of a sham litigation scheme
against Zenith's competitors. 631 F.2d at 1072-73. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that the Sherman Act might be justifiably applicable to
situations in which the litigation maintained by a party is a "mere sham de-
signed to suppress competition." Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366, 380 (1973). Sears, Roebuck Co., an additional defendant in Japanese
Antitrust, also challenged Zenith's advertising practices, asserting that Zenith
violated § 43 of the Lanham Act, which prohibits false designation of origin.
631 F.2d at 1073. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976).
(720)
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Upon Zenith's and NUE's timely demands for jury trial,4 the de-
fendants moved to strike the jury trial demands on the ground that
these actions were "so 'extraordinarily complex,' 'so massive as to make
them unique in the annals of United States antitrust and trade
litigation,' and beyond the practical abilities and limitations of a
jury." 5 The district court denied the motion to strike, concluding that
complexity was "not a constitutionally permissible reason for striking
the plaintiffs' jury demands." 6
On an interlocutory appeal from the district court's pretrial order,7
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit s reversed,
holding that due process requires the denial of a jury trial where the
complexity of the case renders a jury unable to rationally resolve the
issues with a reasonable understanding of the facts and the law to be
applied to those facts. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
The traditional approach to determining whether a right to jury
trial is guaranteed by the seventh amendment 9 arises from the English
4. 631 F.2d at 1073.
5. 478 F. Supp. at 892. The discovery in this case lasted nine years and
over 20 million documents were produced for inspection. Id. at 895. The
depositions alone totalled over 100,000 pages and the court anticipated a trial
of approximately one year. Id.
6. Id. at 942. Dealing as well with the statutory and historical arguments,
the district court rejected the contention that the complexity would make ajury trial so unfair as to deny the parties their fifth amendment due process rights.
Id. at 936. For the Third Circuit's approach to the statutory and historical
arguments, see notes 57-65 and accompanying text infra. In so holding, the
district court emphasized the competence of a jury, the protections which are
available against a jury rendering an irrational verdict, and the functions which
a jury performs in the fact finding and overall judicial process. 478 F. Supp.
at 934-42. For the Third Circuit's treatment of these factors, see notes 75-78
and accompanying text infra. The district court suggested that a jury's ability
to resolve complex cases can be enhanced with proper judicial guidance. 478
F. Supp. at 936. Judge Becker referred to a recent Presidential Commission's
report that forwards suggestions, including those espoused by Judge Becker, to
enable juries to remain competent factfinders in antitrust cases. Id. at 936
n.82, quoting REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES
107 (1979).
7. The Third Circuit permitted the interlocutory appeal which the trial
court certified as appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). 631 F.2d
at 1073. Section 1292(b) allows a district judge to certify an order not other-
wise appealable, and a court of appeals to permit an appeal to be taken from
such an order, which involves a "controlling question of law as to which there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion and [from which] an immediate
appeal . . . may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litiga-
tion .... ." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
8. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Maris and Gibbons.
The majority opinion was written by Chief Judge Seitz. Judge Gibbons filed
a dissenting opinion.
9. The seventh amendment provides in pertinent part: "In suits at com-
mon law . . . the right of a jury trial shall be preserved." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VII.
1980-81]
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practice, as it existed in 1791,10 of affording jury trials in actions at
law "1 but not those in equity.12 While the courts of law and equity
have been merged in the federal system,'3 the law-equity distinction
remains determinant as to when a jury trial will be afforded.' 4 The
Supreme Court has, however, parted with the static historical approach 15
10. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92, at 450 (3d ed. 1976). See
also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935). The English common law
as of 1791 is apparently chosen because the seventh amendment provides that
"in suits at common law" the right to jury "shall be preserved" and the
amendment was adopted in 1791. See Wolfram, The Constitutional History of
the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640-49 (1973).
11. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §8.2, at 351 (2d ed. 1977).
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the framers of the Consti-
tution meant actions at law to be those in which legal rights were at issue
as opposed to actions in equity where equitable rights were at issue and
equitable remedies were administered. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
433, 436 (1830).
12. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 11, § 8.2, at 351. It is often stated
that the jurisdiction of a court of chancery is limited to actions for which the
law courts could not provide an adequate remedy. 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE
ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 132, at 181 (5th ed. 1941). "Adequate remedy"
generally refers to the capabilities of a court to grant complete relief, and
the procedures available to grant that relief, so that complete justice is done.
Id. § 176, at 240. An equitable accounting, where accounts between parties
are balanced and the amount due is enforced, is considered to be an action
where the remedy at law is inadequate and equity jurisdiction is appropriate
because the accounts are complicated and beyond jury determination. H.
MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 202, at 540 (2d ed.
1948). For additional discussion of equitable accountings, see generally 4
J. POMEROY, supra, §§ 1420-21, at 1076-81.
Historically, common law actions were limited to particular forms of ac-
tion. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 11, § 1.3, at 10-12. Redress for situa-
tions not fitting into these forms of action could only be had by petitioning
the king. Id. The chancellor, at the direction of the king, would hear these
petitions using the equitable procedures available to him. Id. The chancellors
eventually developed their own substantive and procedural rules for dealing
with the actions that fell within their jurisdiction, including the remedy of
specific performance, where the remedy at law was inadequate. Id. § 1.4, at
13-14. Thus, a dual system of equity and law developed such that parties to
a dispute might have to bring more than one action and have equitable rights
determined in one forum and legal rights in another, or a party suing in
equity could be non-suited because his proper remedy was at law. Id. § 1.5,
at 15. For a further discussion of the duties and function of the Chancellor,
see Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1980).
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2, 18. The dual system of law and equity was
also abolished in England by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. F. JAMES
& G. HAZARD, supra note 11, § 1.6, at 19.
14. F. JAMES 8c G. HAZARD, supra note 11, § 8.3, at 359-60; 4 C. WRIGHT
& A MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1045, at 154 (1969). While
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could properly merge the two forms of
action, it would have been beyond the scope of their enabling legislation to
have addressed the substantive law question of when the right to a jury trial at-
taches. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 2301, at 11.
15. Note, The Right to A Jury Trial in Complex Litigation, 92 HARv. L.
REV. 898, 901 (1979). This departure from the traditional historical analysis
has been referred to as a dynamic approach. Id. at 899. The district court
24
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and concluded that the availability of equitable relief, and the con-
sequent foreclosure of the right to a jury trial,1 is dependent not upon
the historical basis of the cause of action, but rather upon whether the
legal remedy would be inadequate. 17 Thus, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the expansion of legal remedies has necessarily con-
stricted the scope of equity 's and that the required showing of in-
adequacy of the legal remedies will only be met in rare cases. 19 Sim-
ilarly, newly created statutory causes of action carry the right to a jury
trial if they create legal rights.20
in the instant case, in arguing for the validity of the historical analysis, stated
that recent Supreme Court decisions have relied on the historical analysis in
seventh amendment application. 478 F. Supp. at 927-29.
16. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 11, § 8.2, at 351-52. See notes 8-12
and accompanying text supra.
17. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959) (right to
jury trial of legal issue could be lost to a prior determination of an equitable
issue, only under imperative circumstances). For a discussion of adequacy of
the legal remedy as the criterion for equity jurisdiction, see note 12 supra.
18. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959). The Court
has attributed the expansion of legal remedies to the adoption of Declar-
atory Judgment Act and the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 2 & 18. A jury trial is now
available in situations where, before the adoption of the federal rules, the case
would have been tried to a judge. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14,
§ 2301, at 12.
19. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962). The Dairy
Queen Court reiterated that inadequacy of the legal remedy is a prerequisite
to equity deciding the claim. Id. at 478. The Court noted that the avail-
ability of special masters in complicated cases would make it a rare case where
the remedy at law would be declared inadequate. Id. Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the appointment and compensation of
special masters. FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
20. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (the right to recover real
property existed and was protected at common law thus making the seventh
amendment applicable to a suit brought under a statute establishing a procedure
for recovery of possession of real property); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974) (seventh amendment applicable to actions brought under the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 if the statute creates legal rights and remedies enforceable
in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law); Fleitmann v. Wels-
bach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) (when the penalty involved is treble
damages, the statute should be read as authorizing enforcement of liability by
a trial by jury); Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 162 F. 354 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908)
(action brought under antitrust laws for improper activities in the shipment of
coal was an action at law to which the parties were entitled to a jury trial).
In Ross v. Bernhard, the Supreme Court held that the right to jury trial
accompanies those issues in a shareholders' derivative suit which, if the corpora-
tion were suing in its own right, would be tried to a jury. 396 U.S. 531, 536
(1970). In so holding, the Court read the Fleitmann case as interpreting the
antitrust statute to anticipate a jury trial when treble damages were being
sought. Id. The Court noted that the Fleitmann opinion had "Seventh
Amendment overtones [but] its ultimate rationale was grounded in the anti-
trust laws." Id. See also id. at 547 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
It should be noted that the district court in the instant case rejected the
Ross v. Bernhard language as being dispositive of the issue of whether the
antitrust laws guarantee a jury trial. 478 F. Supp. at 901-02 n.20. The re-
mainder of its statutory analysis parallels that of the Third Circuit. Id. at
25
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The notion of complexity's role in equity jurisdiction and its place
in modern seventh amendment interpretation has been the subject of
considerable recent commentary.21 Moreover, in recent years, com-
plexity has been the basis upon which several courts have stricken jury
trial demands.2 2  The first of these, In re Boise Cascade Securities
Litigation,23 was a securities fraud action brought by shareholders al-
legedly injured in a complex business acquisition effected by Boise
Cascade. 24 The district court held that the factual issues, the com-
plexity of the evidence, and the time involved in trying the case rendered
a jury unable to be a "rational and capable fact finder." 25 The Boise
court relied on Ross v. Bernhard 26 for authority to inquire into a
jury's ability to resolve complex issues.27 In Ross, the Supreme Court
had stated in a footnote that the "practical abilities and limitations of
juries" was one of three factors to be considered when ascertaining the
legal or equitable nature of an issue for seventh amendment purposes.28
902-04. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's statutory analysis, see notes
57-61 and accompanying text infra.
21. See, e.g., Arnold, A Historical Inquiry Into the Right to Trial by Jury
in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 838-46 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Arnold I]; Campbell & Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury
Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980); Arnold,
A Modest Replication to a Lengthy Discourse, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 986 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Arnold II]; Devlin, supra note 12, at 65-95; Janofsky,
The "Big Case": A Big Burden on Our Courts, 66 A.B.A. J. 848, 850 (July
1980).
22. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp.
423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal.
1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980);
In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976). See
notes 22-41 and accompanying text infra.
23. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
24. Id. at 101.
25. Id. at 103. The court noted as problem areas: proof as to establishing
fraud on the defendants' part, difficult accounting concepts, and the possibility
of a four to six-month trial. Id. at 101-04.
26. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). In Ross, the Supreme Court held that a share-
holder asserting legal rights in a derivative action had a right to a jury trial.
Id. at 542. The Ross court adopted the analysis of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469
(1962), to the effect that procedures or forms of action developed after the
merger of law and equity carried with them the right to a jury trial if they
enforced legal rights and provided adequate legal remedies, regardless of the
pre-merger roots of the form of action. 396 U.S. at 542. For a discussion of
Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, see notes 18-19 and accompanying text
supra; notes 32-33 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the merger
of law and equity, see notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
27. 420 F. Supp. at 104.
28. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10. The footnote stated: "[T]he 'legal nature' of
an issue is determined by considering, first the pre-merger custom with refer-
ence to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical
abilities and limitations of juries." Id. The Ross Court inserted this footnote
[VoL. 26: p. 720
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The Boise court found, without elaboration, that the Ross footnote was
of "constitutional dimensions." 29 Relying on it and the fifth amend-
ment due process right to a fair trial,30 the Boise court concluded that
the seventh amendment did not guarantee a jury trial in that instance.3 '
Several recent cases have utilized the language in Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover 3 2 and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,83 to the effect that
inadequacy of the legal remedy is the touchstone of equity jurisdiction,84
in support of the proposition that where a case is beyond a jury's
abilities, the remedy at law is inadequate and determination of the
issues by the court is appropriate.35  The district court in ILC
in its opinion but did not apply it in deciding the case. See id. See also
Wolfram, supra note 10, at 643-44.
29. 420 F. Supp. at 105. Although the Boise court gives no explanation
as to why it found the Ross footnote to be of constitutional dimensions, it
goes on to add that the footnote should be seen as a limitation on seventh
amendment interpretation. Id. However, the same footnote has been looked
upon as mere dicta and not controlling. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litigation,
609 F.2d 411, 425 & n.43 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
But see Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1974) (fac-
tors enumerated in the Ross footnote applied to distinguish between legal
and equitable nature of fraudulent conveyance of promissory notes); SEC v.
Associated Minerals, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 724, 725-26 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (Ross foot-
note criteria applied to alleged securities laws violations).
The Boise court suggested that the Ross footnote recognizes that the due
process right to fairness is defeated when the factfinder in a case is unable to
determine those facts. 420 F. Supp. at 104.
30. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Boise court noted that an impartial and capable
factfinder is essential to the fairness that is guaranteed in the resolution of a
civil action. 420 F. Supp. at 104.
31. 420 F. Supp. at 104. The Boise court argued that the complexity of
a case will reach a point where a jury can no longer be an impartial and
capable factfinder, thereby depriving a party of his right to a fair trial. Id.
32. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). In Beacon Theatres, the Supreme Court held
that only in the most imperative circumstances could the jury trial right be lost
by equitable issues being decided before legal issues. Id. at 510-11. The
district court in that case had denied the defendant's demand for a jury trial
on certain legal issues because the plaintiff had sought declaratory relief which
was characterized by the court as equitable. Id. at 502-03. In discussing
whether the fact that the plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief was traditionally
regarded as equitable justified leaving the entire case to be resolved in equity,
thereby denying the defendant a jury trial, the court noted that under the
Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the legal
remedy was adequate to provide the plaintiff with a fair and orderly adjudica-
tion of the controversy. Id. at 506-08. See also notes 18-19 and accompanying
text supra.
33. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). In Dairy Queen the Court, in analyzing the
claims involved in order to determine whether they were legal or equitable in
nature, reasoned that simply because a complaint is cast in terms of an account.
ing does not necessarily make the claim equitable. Id. at 477-78. Rather, the
Court stated, an equitable accounting, like all other equitable remedies, is
available only where the remedy at law is inadequate. Id. at 478.
34. See notes 32 & 33 supra.
35. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp.
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Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp.36
took this approach and concluded that, because of the difficult account-
ing and engineering concepts involved, the case was beyond the under-
standing of the jurors.8 7 Using a similar analysis in Bernstein v.
Universal Pictures, Inc.,38 to deny a jury trial demand,3 9 the district
court stated that "the adequacy of the legal remedy necessarily involves
the adequacy of the jury and its competency to find the facts." 40 The
court concluded that "to hold that a jury trial is required in this case
423, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 710(S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
929 (1980).
In addition to employing the Dairy Queen and Beacon Theatres analysis,
these cases also utilized the Ross footnote as support for the proposition that
the jury's inability to handle the case made equity jurisdiction appropriate.
Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 66; ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 445; In re U.S.
Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. at 710. For a discussion of the Ross footnote,
see notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Dairy Queen
and Beacon Theatres, see notes 18-19 & 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
36. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978). ILC Peripherals was a complex
antitrust case dealing with an alleged monopolization within the computer
industry. Id. at 426. After a five-month trial, the jury deadlocked and a mis-
trial was declared. Id. The trial judge then granted the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict on the ground that no reasonable jury could find in the
plaintiff's favor. Id. at 444. The court then went on to order that, in the
event that the directed verdict was reversed on appeal and the case remanded
for a new trial, the jury demand be stricken in light of the demonstrated in-
ability of the jury to comprehend the complex facts. Id. at 448. The court
suggested that even if jury trials are not altogether eliminated in complex
antitrust cases, there should at least be a limit of one jury trial in such cases.
Id.
37. Id. at 445-46, citing Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. at 478;
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. at 509. The ILC Peripherals
court took note of the Supreme Court's observation that in order for a party
to demonstrate that the legal remedy is inadequate in an accounting between
parties, the accounts must be "of such 'a complicated nature' that only a
court of equity can satisfactorily unravel them." 458 F. Supp. at 445, quoting
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. at 478. The ILC court also found sup-
port in the early case of Kirby v. Lakeshore & Mich. R.R. for the proposition
that equity has a special role in the trial of complex issues. 458 F. Supp. at
446, citing Kirby v. Lakeshore & Mich. R.R., 120 U.S. 130 (1866). It should
also be pointed out, however, that the ILC court recognized that the mere
existence of complicated facts was not a basis for equity jurisdiction. 458
F. Supp. at 446, citing Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633 (1914); United
States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451 (1906).
38. 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Bernstein case was an immense
class action of music composers and lyricists, with members numbering be-
tween 400 and 1100, asserting antitrust violations against members of the
motion picture and television industry. Id. at 61-62. In stressing the com-
plexity of the case, the court noted that resolution of the litigation would re-
quire over 1,000 "mini-trials," consideration of esoteric accounting problems,
and a four-month principal trial-assuming the court devoted an entire
five-day week to the case. Id. at 62-64.
39. Id. at 70.
40. Id. at 66.
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would be to hold that the seventh amendment gives a single party at
its choice the right to an irrational verdict." 41
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has recently held that there is no complexity except to the
seventh amendment.4 2 In In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation
(hereinafter referred to as USF),43 a protracted, multi-party action
involving alleged securities law violations, 44 the Ninth Circuit reversed
a district court decision that had denied a jury trial demand on grounds
of complexity,45 holding that there is no complexity exception to the
seventh amendment.4 6 In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the
argument that a complex securities case, where accounting concepts are
to be introduced at trial, was analogous to an action for an equitable
accounting where, traditionally, no right to jury trial exists.4 7 The USF
court also suggested that reliance upon the Ross footnote as a basis for
denying the right to a jury trial was unfounded.4 8 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit expressed its confidence in the fundamental competence of
juries, 49 and thus concluded that no case is so complex that a party's
41. Id. at 71.
42. In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
43. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
44. In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D. Cal. 1977),
rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). The
district court in USF commented that the documents that would have to be
read and understood by the factfinder "would be like sitting down to read
the first 90 volumes of the Federal Reporter, 2d Series - including all the
headnotes." 75 F.R.D. at 707.
45. 75 F.R.D. at 714. The district court set out guidelines to be con-
sidered in determining when complex litigation would fall within equity's
jurisdiction. First, mere complexity alone is not enough, but it may suffice
if coupled with complicated accounting problems which are not amenable to
jury determination. Id. at 711. Second, jury members must be incapable
of understanding and dealing rationally with the issues. Id. Third, un-
usually long trials may make extraordinary demands upon the jurors, pre-
venting them from functioning effectively throughout the trial. Id.
46. 609 F.2d at 432.
47. Id. at 423. For a discussion of the equitable accounting and its place
in equity jurisprudence, see note 12 supra.
48. 609 F.2d at 426. For a discussion of the Ross footnote, see notes
28-29 and accompanying text supra. The USF court reasoned that, since sub-
sequent Supreme Court decisions did not consider the practical abilities and
limitations of juries and determined the right to a jury by examining the
legal or equitable nature of an issue, the Ross footnote was not to be read
as "establishing a functional interpretation of the Seventh Amendment." 609
F.2d at 426.
49. 609 F.2d at 427. The court argued that to assume that jurors are
incapable of understanding complicated matters "unnecessarily and improp-
erly demeans the intelligence of the citizens of this Nation. . . . [Rather,]
[j]urors, if properly instructed and treated with deserved respect, bring col-
lective intelligence, wisdom, and dedication to their tasks which is rarely equalled
in other areas of public service." Id. at 430. For a discussion of jury's com-
petency as factfinder, see generally Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue:
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due process right to a fair trial is undermined by the possibility of the
rendition of an irrational verdict.50 The court reasoned that with the
available procedural devices 51 and competent attorneys, proficient at
organizing voluminous, esoteric information, a jury is fully able to
understand the case before it.5 2
Against this background, the Third Circuit began its analysis in
Japanese Antitrust by outlining the areas of complexity involved:
1) proof of the Antidumping Act claims,58 2) proof of the alleged con-
spiracy,5 4 3) resolution of technical financial issues,55 and 4) under-
standing various conceptually difficult legal and factual issues.66
The threshold issue for the court was the argument raised by the
appellees that the Clayton Act provided a statutory right to a jury trial,
making a seventh amendment analysis unnecessary.57 In rejecting this
argument,5 8 the court distinguished the Clayton Act remedy provision
from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act remedy provision, to
which the appellees sought to compare it, and as to which the Supreme
Court had found congressional intent to include in the legislation a
right to a jury trial.59 The majority in Japanese Antitrust was unable
to find that Congress had expressed a similar intent in the Clayton Act.60
However, the court observed that, even if the appellees' argument was
Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 Tx. L. REv. 47 (1977).
But see notes 75-78 and accompanying text infra.
50. 609 F.2d at 432.
51. Id. at 427-29. The court cited several examples: (1) FED. R. Civ. P.
56 (summary judgment entered as a matter of law); (2) FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b)
(motion for separate trial on certain issues); and (3) FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b)
(district court may appoint special masters to assist jury with complex matters).
609 F.2d at 429.
52. 609 F.2d at 427, 431.
53. 631 F.2d at 1073. For the applicable provision of the Antidumping
Act, see note 2 supra.
54. 631 F.2d at 1073.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1075.
58. Id. at 1078.
59. Id. at 1075-76, citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). The
Lorillard Court found that a right to jury trial was intended by Congress'
"directive that the ADEA be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies,
and procedures of the [Fair Labor Standards Act.]" Id. at 580 (emphasis by
the Court). The Court went on to note that a statutory right to jury trial
was well established under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 580.
60. 631 F.2d at 1076. The court also rejected the appellees' contention
that Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 162 F. 354 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), and Fleit-
mann v. Welsbach St. Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916), may be read as having
recognized that the Clayton Act created a statutory right to a jury trial.
631 F.2d at 1076-77. These cases, upholding the right to jury trial for ac-
tions brought under the antitrust laws, were interpreted by the majority to
have merely applied the seventh amendment to statutorily created causes of
action. Id. For further discussion of the Fleitmann and Welsbach cases, see
note 20 and accompanying text supra.
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.accepted, a statutorily created right to a jury trial could not withstand
a successful due process objection.61
The court next rejected all of the appellant's historically grounded
contentions: 62 first, that extraordinary complexity rendered a suit
'equitable in nature, thus making the seventh amendment inappli-
cable; 63 second, that in some cases complexity alone rendered jury
-determination unsuitable; 64 and finally, that the chancellor, as part of
61. 631 F.2d at 1078 n.7.
62. Id. at 1078-83. Before discussing the merits of the historical arguments,
the court stated that its understanding of the relevance of complexity to the fifth
amendment to be when "circumstances render the jury unable to decide in
.a proper manner." Id. at 1079. By "proper manner," the court explained
that it is presumed by law that a jury will render its verdict by some rational
means, although not necessarily with scientific precision. Id., citing Schulz
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 350 U.S. 523, 526 (1956). The Japanese Antitrust court
also concluded that the Ross footnote was too cursory to indicate that the
Supreme Court had announced a new application of the seventh amendment.
.631 F.2d at 1080. For a discussion of the Ross footnote, see notes 28-29 and
accompanying text supra. The Ross footnote, however, was read by the court
to indicate that a jury's practical abilities and limitations may limit the range
of cases subject to the seventh amendment. 631 F.2d at 1080.
63. 631 F.2d at 1080-81. In so concluding, the court distinguished the
equitable accounting cases relied upon by appellants from the instant case,
.seen by the court as similar to tort actions for damages in which American
courts have held that an equitable accounting is not available. Id., citing
United States v. Bitter Root Dev. Co., 200 U.S. 451, 478-79 (1906) (tort action
not within equity's jurisdiction even if accounting necessary) (other citations
.omitted).
64. 631 F.2d at 1081-83. The court noted that the appellants relied on
cases which were deficient in three respects. First, several cases relied upon
required more than complexity to confer equity jurisdiction. The appellants
had cited a passage from an old English case which purported to be a statement
-of a pre-merger equity practice that the chancellor would try cases that, be-
cause of complexity, could not have been conveniently tried to a jury. Id.
.at 1081, citing Clark v. Cookson, 2 Ch. D. 746 (1876). The majority main-
tained that the cases offered by the appellants which cited the Clark passage
had a clear basis other than complexity for invoking equity jurisdiction. 631
F.2d at 1081, citing Wedderburn v. Pickering, 13 Ch. D. 769 (1879) (plaintiff
.sought injunction); Garlings v. Royds, 25 W.R. 123 (1876) (plaintiff sought
,cancellation of note allegedly obtained by fraud).
Second, another case forwarded by the appellants involved issues not prop-
erly triable by a common law jury. The appellants cited to a case in which the
chancellor exercised jurisdiction because he believed it would be "absurd and
monstrous" to send the case to a jury. 631 F.2d at 1081-82, citing Blad v.
Bamfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674). The Third Circuit reasoned that the
.chancellor exercised jurisdiction in that case because it involved matters of
international relations, not normally a proper matter for a law court. 631
F.2d at 1082.
Lastly, the court found that one old English case was simply too dubious
to be relied upon. The appellants had cited a case in which the chancellor
retained jurisdiction upon concluding that a judge was better able to appraise
,the documentary evidence than a "jury of ploughmen." Id. at 1082, citing
Clench v. Tomley, 21 Eng. Rep. 13, 13 (Ch. 1603). For a further discussion
.of the validity of Clench v. Tomley, see Arnold I, supra note 21, at 840-45;
Arnold II, supra note 21, at 987-88; Campbell & Le Poidevin, supra note 21,
:at 974-85.
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his power to govern the boundary between law and equity, would have
exercised jurisdiction over an action at law if he considered the jury
to be incapable of deciding the case.65
The court, however, accepted the appellants' final argument that
the due process clause of the fifth amendment prohibits a jury trial if
the suit is too complex for a jury to fairly decide.66 The court reasoned
that due process guarantees the presence of a competent fact finder 67
and that a jury which is unable to understand the facts and the law to
be applied thereto presents too great a risk of an erroneous decision.68
The court reasoned further that a court's ability to do basic justice is
undermined when a jury is unable to render a rational decision.6 9
In balancing the fifth amendment interest in due process against
the seventh amendment guarantee of a right to a jury trial, the court
concluded that the loss of the right to jury trial did not implicate
concerns as fundamental as did the due process objections.70 The court
reasoned that, while justice was unlikely to be done by a jury unable to
understand the case,7 ' justice could still be achieved if the judge were
to decide the case.7 2
65. 631 F.2d at 1083. The Third Circuit, being unable to find other courts
who had done so, chose not to "pioneer in this use of history." Id. at 1083.
But see Devlin, supra note 12, at 107. In analogizing the federal district courtjudge to the chancellor of 1791, Lord Devlin comments, "if the court denies
trial by jury in any case in which it deems 'the practical abilities' to be insuffi-
cient, the court will have history on its side." Id.
66. 631 F.2d at 1084, 1086. The court admonished that a jury trial de-
mand should be denied on due process grounds only in exceptional cases. Id.
at 1088. The complexity must be so great that a jury will be unable to
"decide by rational means with a reasonable understanding of the evidence
and applicable legal rules." Id.
67. Id. at 1084 8c n.14, citing Citron v. Arco Corp., 377 F.2d 750 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 973 (1967). In Citron, the court had found that fre-
quent interruption during presentation of the plaintiff's evidence violated the
plaintiff's due process rights by making it impossible for the jury to compe-
tently decide the case. 377 F.2d at 752-53.
68. 631 F.2d at 1084, citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal
and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("The primary value pro-
moted by due process in factfinding procedures is to 'minimize the risk of
erroneous decisions.' ").
69. 631 F.2d at 1084.
70. Id. at 1084-85.
71. Id. at 1084.
72. Id. at 1085. In reaching its conclusion, the court recognized that jus-
tice is frequently administered without a jury in equitable and maritime ac-
tions. Id.
In rejecting the appellees' argument that striking the jury demand be-
cause of the possibility of an erroneous decision constituted prospective relief,
the court reasoned that "the procedural requirements of due process are by
their very nature prospective: They are safeguards against the possibility of
erroneous and arbitrary deprivations of liberty and property. This feature
never has been thought to diminish their importance." Id. The court noted
that the possibility of juror error where it does not understand the case is
anything but remote. Id.
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The Third Circuit rejected the district court's argument that an
irrational verdict can be protected against by the use of the directed
verdict and the judgment notwithstanding the verdict,78 on the ground
that these safeguards are inadequate because a "court may not grant
. . . these motions if the evidence might reasonably support a verdict
for either side." 74
In response to the district court's appraisal of the desirable qualities
which juries bring to the judicial process,7 5 the Third Circuit found
these qualities to be of no substantial value in very complex cases. 8
As stated by the court, a jury could not be a competent fact finder in
complex cases because a long trial, while not only disabling, weeds out
prospective jurors with backgrounds helpful in understanding complex
matters, 77 and an overwhelming and confusing mass of evidence and
technical procedures in complex litigation makes an erroneous decision
a significant probability.78 In contrast, the majority lists as a judge's
strengths in handling protracted litigation his ability to preside over
long trials without disrupting his personal life, 79 the probability of the
judge's familiarity with technical substantive matters and civil litigation
procedures,80 and the judge's ability to use procedural devices and trial
techniques to assist him in managing the trial and resolving difficult
issues.8 '
73. Id. at 1087.
74. Id., citing Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978).
75. 478 F. Supp. at 938-42. The district court listed as some of the impor-
tant qualities that juries bring to the decisionmaking process: 1) black box
decisionmaking - where the jury issues a verdict without having to explain
or justify its decision - thereby enabling it to do justice, though the result
may be at variance with the law, and to draw the line in borderline cases
without making the decision appear arbitrary; and 2) the jury serves as a
.check on judicial power. Id.
76. 631 F.2d at 1085. The Third Circuit concluded that a jury doing
equity in cases it was unable to understand was nothing more than arbitrary
and unprincipled decision making. Id. According to the majority, the line-
drawing function had little merit where the jury could not understand the
-evidence or legal rules relevant to the issue. Id. Finally, the court con-
cluded that a jury was not an effective check on judicial power where it could
not understand the case. Id. Rather, the court saw an irrational factfinder
as a tool of erratic and arbitrary judicial power. Id.
77. Id. at 1086, citing Note, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Pro-
tracted Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775, 776-83
<1978).
78. 631 F.2d at 1086.
79. Id. at 1087.
80. Id.
81. Id. Techniques referred to by the court include colloquies with ex-
p ert witnesses and reopening testimony as to issues on which he
nds himself unable to decide. Id. Other trial techniques, espoused by the
district court in Boise Cascade, included review of daily transcripts, flexibility
in scheduling trial activities, and review of selected portions of testimony.
420 F. Supp. at 104-05. The Japanese Antitrust court suggested that the judge's
ability to resolve complex cases be presumed and that inquiry be focused on
-the jury's abilities. 631 F.2d at 1087.
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In recognizing that it may be difficult to ascertain the exceptional
case which is too complex for jury determination, 2 the court set out
three admittedly imprecise guidelines 83 to assist in that examination:
1) the overall size of the suit, including the length of trial, the amount
of evidence and the number of issues requiring individual considera-
tion; 84 2) the conceptual difficulty of legal issues and the facts relating
to those issues; 85 and 3) the difficulty of segregating distinct aspects of
the case.8 6
The court suggested that a party will be protected against an
erroneous denial of a jury trial by trusting the good faith concerns that
district judges have for the right to a jury trial,8 7 the availability of a
writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals,8 8 and the requirement
that the trial judge make explicit findings of complexity in cases where
he or she denies the jury demand.8 9 In disposing of the case, the court
remanded it to the trial court for a determination of the complexity of
the case in light of the majority's opinion. 90
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gibbons recognized the com-
plexity of the case, but attributed much of it to the consolidation of the
two cases. 9 1 He argued that the majority's treatment of the consti-
tutional issue was unnecessary because, as the cases could be severed and
thereby made less complex, the court was considering a "hypothetical
construction of a series of procedural rulings." 92 Hence, Judge Gibbons
82. 631 F.2d at 1088. The court explained that, to preserve the right
to jury trial, the due process objection should prevail only in situations where
the case is so complex that the jury cannot rationally decide the case. Id.
The court suggested that severance and other methods of reducing complexity
should be employed before denying the jury trial demand. Id.
83. Id. at 1088-89. In recognizing the lack of precision in the guidelines,
the court reasoned that, because most of the district judges who will be apply-
ing them are genuinely concerned about preserving the jury trial right, the
right to jury trial will not thereby be threatened. Id. at 1089. For listing of
these guidelines, see notes 84-86 and accompanying text infra.
84. 631 F.2d at 1088.
85. Id. at 1088-89. The court noted that the complexity of these matters
would be reflected in the amount of expert testimony anticipated and the
probable length and detail of jury instructions. Id.
86. Id. at 1089.
87. Id.
88. Id. The writ of mandamus is a normal device for ordering a jury trial
where one has been wrongly denied. C. WRIGHT, supra note 10, § 102, at
516. Abuse of discretion as the standard for the issuance of writ of mandamus
is set out in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 397 U.S. 104, 110 (1964).
89. 631 F.2d at 1089.
90. Id. at 1090. The majority concluded that the district court had only
resolved the legal issue presented and had not made an adequate determina-
tion as to the specific complexities of the instant case. Id.
91. Id. at 1091 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See note I supra.
92. 631 F.2d at 1091 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons felt that
the proper issue was whether a single claim for relief against a single defendant
would be too complex for jury determination. Id. He asserted that the
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took the position that the axiom that constitutional pronouncements
should be avoided unless required should have prevailed.9 3
In the remainder of his dissent, Judge Gibbons agreed with the
majority's treatment of the historical94 and statutory arguments.9 5
With respect to the due process argument,90 however, he would have
held that "there is no case in which properly separated claims for relief
cognizable at common law would be so complex that trial by jury would
amount to a violation of due process." 97 He also expressed a fear that a
case-by-case determination of complexity would be basically unreview-
able as a matter of course, even with the majority's provision for a
pretrial writ of mandamus.98 Consequently, he would opt for the
availability of interlocutory review as a matter of right.99
In reviewing the Japanese Antitrust decision, it should be noted
that, although the majority found no statutory right to a jury trial,1 00
there is language in Ross v. Bernhard to support a contrary conclu-
sion.10 ' However, the court did make the salient observation that if
the fifth amendment due process interest outweighed the seventh
amendment right to a jury trial, a statutory right to jury trial would
have no more success in withstanding the due process considerations. 102
false issue decided by the majority was whether, by joinder and consolidation
of claims, a case could become so complex that the right to jury trial must
yield. Id. at 1092 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1091-92 n.2 (Gibbons, J., dissenting), citing Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1947); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
94. 631 F.2d at 1092 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
historical arguments, see notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
95. 631 F.2d at 1092 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
statutory argument, see notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
96. For a discusssion of the due process argument, see notes 66-81 and
accompanying text supra.
97. 631 F.2d at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons commented
that his contrariety with the majority was due in part to his perception of the
importance of the jury's role in the judicial process. Id.
98. Id. Judge Gibbons reasoned that in a mandamus proceeding it would
be difficult to establish that a judge had abused his discretion in applying the
guidelines presented by the majority. Id. For a discussion of mandamus, see
note 88 and accompanying text supra. For the guidelines established by the
majority, see notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra. In the case of a post-
trial appeal on the ground that a jury trial was wrongly denied, the dissent
maintained that it would be highly unlikely that an appellate court would
order a retrial of an otherwise error-free case. 631 F.2d at 1093 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
99. 631 F.2d at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Judge
Gibbons' suggestion of interlocutory review as a matter of right, see notes 122-23
and accompanying text infra.
100. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
101. 396 U.S. at 536. See note 20 supra.
102. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
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Although the Third Circuit's conclusion as to the Ross footnote, 03
and the appellants' attempted analogy of a complex antitrust case to
an equitable accounting,104 were consistent with findings made by the
Ninth Circuit in USF,05 the two circuits differ respecting the due
process issue.' 06 It is suggested that their differences are grounded
principally in their respective views as to the competency of jurors in
complex cases and the degree to which complexity can be reduced. 0 7
It is thus submitted that the nub of the conflict is simple and direct-
if one accepts the premise that, at some point, complexity renders a
jury unable to decide the case, then one cannot dispute the Third
Circuit's conclusion that due process requires that a particularly com-
plex case can be tried to a judge. 0s
The majority, in acknowledging that its standard for complexity is
imprecise, 09 relied on the positive attitudes of district judges regarding
the right to jury trial to protect against dilution of the seventh amend-
ment. 110 It is submitted that this imprecise standard will create prac-
tical problems in that a district judge's own prejudices toward jury
trials may well color his findings with respect to complexity."' It must
be recognized, however, that this is not a situation in which a court
is able to formulate a clear test. Thus, given the guidelines established
by the Third Circuit, the district courts will undoubtedly develop
patterns by which to determine complexity, perhaps by utilizing the
instant case as a paradigm.
With respect to the majority's suggestion that, before denying a
jury trial demand on grounds of complexity, efforts, including severance,
be made to simplify the case,112 it is submitted that the ramifications
103. See note 62 supra. For a more complete discussion regarding the Ross
footnote, see notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
104. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
105. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra. Judge Gibbons, in
his dissent, agreed with both the Ninth Circuit and the Japanese Antitrust ma-jority regarding the Ross footnote and appellant's attempted analogy to an
equitable accounting. 631 F.2d at 1092 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
106. Compare notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra (USF) with notes
66-72 and accompanying text supra (Japanese Electronics).
107. Compare note 49 and accompanying text supra (USF) with notes
75-78 and accompanying text supra (Japanese Electronics).
108. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra.
109. See notes 83-86 and accompanying text supra.
110. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
111. This assertion seems reasonable in view of the court's implicit recog-
nition that all judges do not share the same attitudes toward the jury trial
right when it suggested that it would rely on the overwhelming number ofjudges sharing a positive attitude toward this right. 631 F.2d at 1089. Judge
Gibbons expressed his concern that a district judge's sympathies or hostilities
toward the policies of the lawsuit itself may color his determination of com-
plexity. Id. at 1093 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
112. See note 82 supra. In emphasizing the need to enhance the jury's
capabilities or reduce complexity, the majority advocated utilizing procedures
[VCOL. 26: p. 720
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from such measures will be significant. In addition to the increased
burden on already overcrowded courts,118 which will have to try
severed claims of once consolidated cases, 14 one can anticipate the
onerous burdens on plaintiffs and defendants who, but for severance,
would be litigating multiple claims in the same action. One must also
consider the possible collateral estoppel effects where a plaintiff whose
claim is severed seeks to assert collateral estoppel against a defendant
who has fully litigated that same issue with respect to other severed
plaintiffs. 15 Although these concerns may seem to be onerous in terms
of the burdens imposed, if considered in light of protecting a consti-
tutional right, it is submitted that there is sufficient justification for
them."16
In response to the majority's assertion that the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict is not an effective safeguard against an erroneous
verdict because it may not be granted where the evidence might rea-
sonably support the verdict,1 7 it is submitted that an increased utiliza-
tion of the special verdict 118 or the general verdict accompanied by
interrogatories 119 will reveal more specific findings by the jury and
suggested in the Manual for Complex Litigation. 631 F.2d at 1088. For
additional methods of facilitating juror resolution of complex cases, see REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES (1979); Janofsky, supra
note 21, at 850.
113. See Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404 (3rd Cir.
1980). At the appellate level alone in the Third Circuit, each active circuitjudge is assigned 275 fully briefed cases per year - increased from the 90
assigned to a circuit judge in 1968. Id. at 406.
114. The trial court is permitted to sever trials for purposes of convenience,
avoiding prejudice, or economy, always preserving inviolate the right of trial
by jury as provided by statute or the constitution. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
115. Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs where the plaintiff, not a
party to a previous action, seeks to preclude a defendant from relitigating an
issue which the defendant has defended unsuccessfully in a prior action.
Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979).
For a general discussion of the use of offensive collateral estoppel with
respect to common issues by a person not a party to prior litigation, see id.
at 329-31; Comment, Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel Under the Full and
Fair Opportunity Test, XV LAND AND WATER L. REV. 247 (1980); Note, Col-
lateral Estoppel Applied Offensively Where Plaintiffs Were Not Parties or
Privies in the Prior Action, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 144 (1979).
116. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gibbons states that "the Bill of
Rights . . . are designed to promote values other than efficiency." 631 F.2d
at 1091 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
117. See notes 73-74 and accompanying text supra.
118. FED. R. Ctv. P. 49 (a) authorizes the use of special verdicts. It has
even been suggested that the use of the special verdict is "salutory and highly
desirable in a complex and difficult case." 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 14, § 2505, at 494.
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b) authorizes the submission of interrogatories in
connection with a general verdict. Id. This method allows the propriety of
1980-81]
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indicate whether it did in fact reach its verdict based on a reasonable
and rational understanding of the evidence.
Finally, it is submitted that Judge Gibbons' fear that the district
judges' discretion in these matters will go unfettered where a party's
recourse for a wrongful denial is by writ of mandamus is well
founded. 120 As he notes, where a district court judge follows the guide-
lines set out by the majority, it will be quite difficult for an appellate
court hearing a mandamus request to hold that a trial judge abused his
discretion. 121 However, it is questionable whether Judge Gibbons'
suggestion that use of an interlocutory appeal as a matter of right 122
would produce a more favorable result. Depending upon whether one
categorizes a determination of complexity as a conclusion of fact or a
conclusion of law, the standard of review on appeal may be no easier
to apply than the abuse of discretion standard.123
Aside from the proliferation of litigation with the concomitant
burdens and the likelihood of inconsistent determinations of complexity,
this decision, although not finding a statutory jury trial right, indicates
that statutorily provided, as well as the seventh amendment, rights to
jury trial are effectively circumscribed by the due process objections.124
Another significant effect of the majority's opinion is that parties to
complex cases-surely securities, antitrust, patent infringement, and
other actions involving highly sophisticated factual or legal concepts-
arising in this Circuit are potentially precluded from obtaining a jury
trial. Given the nature of today's society with business growing, be-
coming more complex and subject to increased government regulation,
it would seem to be easier than the majority anticipates to find those
exceptional cases that are beyond a jury's comprehension. However, in
that the majority did stress that means of reducing complexity be
utilized before a jury demand be denied on complexity grounds,125 it is
suggested that, if measures are sincerely undertaken to simplify a case,
those cases denied jury trial may well be the exception and not the
norm.
Looking beyond the impact of the decision in the Third Circuit,
however, it seems clear that the ultimate due process issue, on which
a general verdict to be checked against the jury's answers to the interroga-
tories. C. WRIGHT, supra note 10, § 94, at 465.
120. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
121. See id. For discussion of mandamus, see note 88 supra.
122. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
123. On appeal, findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Conversely, conclusions of law are completely
reviewable on appeal. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 2588, at
750.
124. See notes 61 & 66-72 and accompanying text supra.
125. See notes 82 & 112 supra.
[V/OL. 26: p. 720,
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the Third and Ninth Circuits split,126 will continue to engender con-
troversy until it is definitively resolved by the Supreme Court. 27
Mark L. Collins
126. See notes 106-08 and accompanying text supra.
127. The Supreme Court has, however, denied certiorari in the U.S. Finan-
cial Securities case. 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
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JUDGMENTS - EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL - AN UNREASONABLE FAILURE
TO INTERVENE MAY PRECLUDE OUTSIDERS' SUBSEQUENT
LITIGATION OF DECIDED ISSUES.
Society Hill Cvic Association v. Harris (1980)
In October 1973, a consent decree was entered into between Octavia
Hill Association, a non-profit housing corporation, and a group of its
tenants.' Under the consent decree, the tenants agreed to surrender
possession of their leaseholds in exchange for a promise by the Phila-
delphia Redevelopment Authority (R.D.A.) to provide homes for per-
manent relocation in the Society Hill section of Philadelphia.2 In
1974, when the R.D.A. failed to provide such housing, the tenants filed
an action against the R.D.A. and the United States Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, claiming that these agencies failed to
comply with their statutory and constitutional obligations to provide
permanent relocation housing.3 A group of twenty Society Hill prop-
erty owners sought to intervene in the second suit, contending that the
construction of relocation housing in that section of the city would be
contrary to various federal laws and regulations. 4 Intervention was
denied,5 and the two agencies and the tenants entered into a second
1. Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1049 (3d Cir. 1980).
The consent decree was approved in a case captioned Octavia Hill Ass'n v.
Hayes, Nos. 73-1594 to 73-1599 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1973). The Association was
formed to rehabilitate certain premises in the Society Hill section of Phila-
delphia. 632 F.2d at 1049. The 1973 lawsuits were actions in ejectment to
force the tenants to leave their homes to make way for the renovation. Id.
2. 632 F.2d at 1049. The defendant tenants counterclaimed and named the
R.D.A. as a third party plaintiff. The original plaintiff, Octavia Hill, was em-
powered to begin its redevelopment pursuant to a contractual agreement with
the R.D.A. See Octavia Hill Ass'n v. Hayes, Nos. 73-1594 to 73-1599 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 16, 1973).
3. Dodson v. Salvitti, No. 74-1854 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1977), aff'd mem., 571
F.2d 571 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 883 (1978). The plaintiffs sought relief
under the National Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1490h (1976); the National
Housing and Urban Redevelopment Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 8§ 1469-1469c (1976);
and the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976). See Dodson v. Salvitti, 77 F.R.D.
674, 675 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (denial of intervention). In addition, the plaintiffs
alleged deprivations of their civil rights and added counts under the Civil Rights
Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 2000d and 3601 (1976). See 77 F.R.D. at 675.
4. Dodson v. Salvitti, 77 F.R.D. 674, 676 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
5. Id. at 677. The property owners sought to intervene as of right under
Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for such
intervention:
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or trans-
action which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
(738)
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consent decree. 0
In 1977, a second group of Society Hill residents, the Society Hill
Civic Association (Association), 7 filed suit under the review provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act.8 Advancing many of the same allega-
tions as the applicants for intervention,9 the plaintiffs challenged the
agencies' authority to construct low-income government subsidized hous-
ing in their neighborhood.' 0 The defendants moved for judgment on
the pleadings," contending that the plaintiffs were collaterally estopped
his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The rule also requires that an application for inter-
vention be timely. Id. For a discussion of intervention under the federal rules,
see notes 56-60 and accompanying text infra.
Intervention was denied in Dodson on two grounds. 77 F.R.D. at 676.
First, the court found that the applicants did not allege injuries which would
constitute a deprivation of a property right of the type necessary to sustain
intervention as of right. Id. Second, the court found the application for inter-
vention was untimely because it was made two and one-half years after the
initiation of the action, of which the applicants were charged with knowledge.
Id. at 677.
6. 632 F.2d at 1049. The consent decree was approved in a case captioned
Dodson v. Salvitti, No. 74-1854 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1977). This consent decree
provided that the agencies construct new housing to be used as permanent re-
placement housing for the tenants. 632 F.2d at 1049.
7. Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, No. 77-3102 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 1979),
rev'd, 632 F.2d 1045 (3d Cir. 1980). The plaintiff association consisted of various
residents of Society Hill, but did not include any of the twenty residents whose
motion for intervention had been denied in Dodson. 632 F.2d at 1062 (Sloviter,
J., dissenting). The second group of residents was represented by the same
counsel and presented its complaint to the same judge who had denied inter-
vention to the first group. Id. at 1062-63 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
8. 632 F.2d at 1055. Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act pro-
vides in pertinent part: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
9. See 632 F.2d at 1062 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
10. 632 F.2d at 1049. Plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that: new housing
could not be constructed unless no suitable existing structures were available,
632 F.2d at 1056; see 42 U.S.C. § 4626 (1976); that tenants were not qualified to
receive such housing because no federal funds were used to acquire their old
homes, 632 F.2d at 1056-57 & n.10; see 42 U.S.C. §4601(6); that the new con-
struction would not comply with existing zoning laws, see 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.205
(h), 880.209(a)(13) (1979); and that HUD had forced R.D.A. to consent to the
decree, and thereby impermissibly interfered with site selection decisions by local
authorities. 632 F.2d at 1058; see 42 U.S.C. § 5301-17 (1976).
The Association filed its claim shortly after the final denial of the motion
to intervene in the Dodson case. 632 F.2d at 1053. See note 5 and accompany-
ing text supra. In its complaint, the Association contended that it was unaware
of the Dodson action until late 1976, and was never served with process. Id. at
1052. For the purposes of the defendant's motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, this averment of fact was accepted as true. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c);
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.17, at 218 (2d ed. 1977).
11. 632 F.2d at 1049. Defendants moved to dismiss under rule 12(c). Id.
Rule 12(c) provides in pertinent part: "After the pleadings are dosed but within
such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the
pleadings." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
1980-81]
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from raising any issues which had been presented by the applicants for
intervention.12 The district court ruled in favor of the defendants, hold-
ing that the plaintiffs were precluded from bringing their action; 1
first, because they were in privity with those residents whose application
for intervention was adjudged untimely in the earlier litigation, 14 and
second, because they had waived their rights to be heard by failing to
intervene in the earlier lawsuit.'5
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit 16 reversed and remanded,' 7 holding that an unreasonable or un-
justified failure to intervene may preclude a later attack on the judg-
ment, but that on the facts as averred, plaintiffs were not estopped by
their failure to intervene in the earlier litigation. Society Hill Civic
Association v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045 (3d Cir. 1980).
To promote judicial efficiency and economy, the courts have created
a body of law which prevents the relitigation of cases or issues which
had been resolved in an earlier judicial proceeding.'8 This body of
law, loosely referred to as res judicata, includes two separate but re-
lated concepts regarding the preclusive effects given to a prior judg-
ment.' 9 True res judicata, which is also referred to as claim preclusion, 20
provides that when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a
final judgment on the merits of a case,21 the parties to the suit, and
12. 632 F.2d at 1048-49.
13. Id. at 1049.
14. Id. For a discussion of privity, see notes 40-48 and accompanying text
infra.
15. 632 F.2d at 1049. For a discussion of estoppel by failure to intervene,
see notes 62-69 and accompanying text infra.
16. The case was heard by Judges Garth, Rosenn, and Sloviter. Judge
Garth delivered the opinion of the court. Judge Sloviter filed a dissenting
opinion.
17. 632 F.2d at 1053. The case was remanded so that the district court
judge could develop facts on which to apply the appellate court's statement of
the law of preclusion. Id.
18. See Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 578 (1974). The Gaudet
court stated that the concept of res judicata "rests upon considerations of judicial
economy of judicial time." Id., quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S.
351, 352 (1876).
19. See 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 0.405[1], at 621 (2d ed. 1980).
For an early United States Supreme Court case bifurcating the concept of res
judicata, see Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
20. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 11.3, at 532-33. In tradi-
tional terminology, true res judicata is called merger or bar; in modern termi-
nology, it is called claim preclusion. Id. at 532. Because courts continue to
use the term "res judicata" to describe the preclusive effects of claim preclusion,
that term will be used throughout this note.
21. See 1B J. MOORE, supra note 19, 0.405[l], at 622. "True" res judicata
is not concerned with the particular issues which were raised or omitted in the
earlier action; a party whose cause of action is precluded under this branch of
res judicata may not relitigate any claims or defenses which might have been
raised in the original action but were not. See id. 0.410[1], at 1151, 0.410[2],
at 1163.
[VOL. 26: p. 738
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those in privity with them, are bound as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, and as to every
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.
22
The term res judicata is used in other contexts to connote the finality
ascribed to a prior judicial resolution of an issue 23 between two parties
when these parties subsequently litigate a different cause of action.
24
The second situation is more accurately entitled collateral estoppel or
issue preclusion.25 The basic difference between res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel is that the former operates to extinguish entire claims
which were, or should have been presented in the original action,26
22. See id. 0.405[l], at 623-25; 0.409r], at 1001.
Within the last decade, mutuality has been severely limited or abandoned
by some courts as one of the prerequisites for the application of res judicata.
See id. at 0.412[1], at 1805; id. at 127-28 nn.2 &c 10 (Supp. 1980). The doctrine
of mutality, which requires that one who asserts the finality of a judgment be
either a party or in privity with a party to the suit in which the judgment was
rendered, was added to the law of preclusion so that neither party could invoke
"the conclusive effect of a[n earlier] judgment unless he would have been bound
if the judgment had gone the other way." Id. 0.412, at 1801. See Bigelow v.
Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912). In 1971,
the Supreme Court approved the abandonment of mutuality in the relatively
narrow field of patent litigation when res judicata was invoked defensively -
that is, when a defendant averred that the plaintiff had already litigated his case
against another party and had lost. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Other courts have since
adopted the holding of Blonder-Tongue, abandoning the mutuality rules as to
the defensive use of res judicata in all types of actions. See lB J. MooRE, supra
note 19, 0.412[l], at 127-28 n.10 (1980 Supp.). Several courts, however, have
refused to abandon the doctrine of mutuality where a person seeks to use a prior
judgment offensively - that is, where a person who did not participate in an
earlier action seeks to estop his opponent from relitigating an issue which had
been resolved against that opponent in the earlier action. See Note, Collateral
Estoppel: The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuality, 41 Mo. L. REV. 521,
534-38 (1976). But see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (al-
lowing offensive use of S.E.C. decision finding defendant guilty of securities
violations).
23. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 11.2, at 532-33; lB J.
MOORE, supra note 19, 405[l], at 622. This second branch of res judicata,
which is also known as collateral estoppel, deals only with issues actually
resolved in prior, but not necessarily identical, lawsuits. Id.
24. See 1B J. MOORE, supra note 19, 405[l], at 622. The same rules of
mutuality apply to collateral estoppel as those applied in true res judicata.
Id. at 0.402[l], at 1801. For a discussion of mutuality in cases involving
true res judicata, see note 22 supra.
25. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 11.2, at 532-33. Because
the courts continue to refer to issue preclusion as "collateral estoppel," the
latter term will be used throughout this note.
26. See, e.g., Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 550 (1947) (final judgment on
claim in one state precludes relitigation in another forum, regardless of whether
claims were potentially severable); Dore v. Kleppe, 552 F.2d 1369, 1374 (5th
Cir. 1975) ("[t]he general rule is that a final judgment is conclusive on the
parties as to all questions of fact and law relevant to the same cause of action
which were or could have been litigated in the prior proceeding."). See also
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 11.8, at 541-44; 1B J. MOORE, supra
note 19, 0.410[2], at 1163-67. Under this rule, any claim which properly
forms a part of the cause of action must be raised or is forever precluded. Id.
43
Editors: Federal Courts and Procedure
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
while the latter precludes the redetermination of only those issues
which are common to the two separate claims or lawsuits and which were
fully and necessarily resolved by the earlier judgment.27
A prerequisite to the operation of either res judicata or collateral
estoppel is a prior final judgment. 28 Collateral estoppel may only be
invoked to preclude relitigation of a contested issue which was fully
treated or necessarily resolved as an integral component of the decision
ultimately reached in the prior action. 29 On the other hand, because
res judicata operates on an entire claim, the final judgment need not
be "on the merits" of the substantive contentions forwarded. 30 Res
The problem which faces courts, practitioners and legal scholars is defining
"cause of action" for res judicata purposes. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra,
§ 11.7, at 540. For a modern attempt to define the dimensions of a claim or
cause of action, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1978).
27. See, e.g., Lawler v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326(1955) (collateral estoppel bars litigant from contesting only "issues actually
litigated and determined in the prior suit"); International Ass'n of Mach. &
Aero. Workers v. Nix, 512 F.2d 125, 131 (5th Cir. 1975) (although consecutive
causes of action are distinct, issues "necessarily litigated and actually decided
in the first suit are barred"). See also F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10,
§ 11.16, at 563-64; IB J, MooRE, supra note 19, 0.443[4], at 3915; notes 23-25
and accompanying text supra. Unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel "does
not preclude inquiry into matters that might have been but actually were not
put in issue and determined in the former action." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
supra, § 11.16, at 563. This general rule, however, is qualified. Id. If the
issue formed part of a claim which was, or should have been raised in an
earlier lawsuit, and the issue was decided or necessarily should have been de-
cided in order to reach the original verdict, the issue is foreclosed. See 113
J. MOORE, supra note 19, 0.443[3], at 3903.
28. See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield and Oglivie, 241 U.S. 22, 28
(1916) ("only a final judgment is res judicata as between the parties"); Gilbert
v. Braniff Int'l Corp., 579 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1968) (judgment which was not
final has no preclusive effect). See also F. JAMES 8c G. HAZARD, supra note 10,
§ 11.4, at 533. ("[t]he judgment must ordinarily be a firm and stable one, the
'last word' of the rendering court - a 'final' judgment"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 41, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
29. See F. JAMES 8c G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 11.16, at 563-64. "Where
issue preclusion is involved between the same parties as those to the original
suit, the one who claims its benefit (proponent) must show that the very fact
or point now in issue was, in the former action, 1) litigated by the parties;
2) determined by the tribunal; and 3) necessarily so determined." Id. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
Rules have been formulated to deal with several problems which fre-
quently arise in determining which issues were actually decided. See generally,
lB J. MOORE, supra note 19, 0.443, at 3901-29. For example, if an issue was
actually contested, but the trier of fact made no express findings, that issue is
finally decided only if the outcome of the case hinged on its resolution. Id. at
3195. Thus, if the victorious party litigated several theories or issues, but the
court did not state which, if any, were accepted, none of these issues are
finally decided. Id. If, however, the court expressly rests its judgment on
alternate sufficient grounds, that judgment precludes relitigation of issues
material in the support of either ground. Id. at 3921.
30. See lB J. MOORE, supra note 19, 0.405[l], at 622. "[T]he underly-
ing policy of res judicata is not restricted to a valid judgment that deals solely
with the merits; it extends to, and includes matters in abatement, such as
[VOL. 26: p. 738
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judicata does not, however, preclude a party from further litigating
issues which formed the basis of the original lawsuit, or from redefining
his case and commencing a second action after a final judgment of
abatement.3'
A second prerequisite for both forms of preclusion is that the party
against whom preclusion is sought8 2 had an opportunity to present his
case to the original court.8 8 In the case of Hansberry v. Lee, 4 the
Supreme Court cast this rule in terms of a constitutional requirement,
finding that the alteration of a litigant's rights by means of earlier
proceedings to which he was not a party, and of which he had neither
formal notice nor an opportunity to be heard, was a denial of due
process.8 5
jurisdiction of the subject matter, federal jurisdiction, jurisdiction over the
res, jurisdiction over the defendant, venue, and related matters." Id. 0.405[5],
at 655-56 (footnotes omitted). A final decision of abatement - for example, a
determination that the statute of limitations has tolled, that the court has no
jurisdiction, or that the complaint was improperly drafted - precludes a party
from resubmitting that complaint. See id. at 659-92. However, unless a deci-
sion in abatement is deemed to be on the merits, or where such dismissal
necessarily determines the underlying merits of a claim, the litigant is free to
pursue his action in another court or under a different theory. See id. See
also Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 955 (1973) (plaintiff was not precluded from seeking mandamus in action
where no jurisdictional amount was required despite dismissal of an earlier
action against the same defendant where jurisdictional amount was required
but not satisfied).
31. See Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); note 30 supra.
2. For a discussion of the parties against whom preclusion can be in-
voked, see note 22 supra.
33. See Makiriw v. Rinard, 336 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1964) (parties to an
action have a right to an opportunity to appear and be heard; if these rights
were not previously granted, collateral estoppel is inapplicable).
34. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). In Hansberry, the plaintiffs sought to enforce a
restrictive covenant in a deed. Id. at 37-38. The contract was valid only if
a specified percentage of landowners signed it, and the defendants claimed
that the requisite number had not signed. Id. at 38. The plaintiffs claimed
that the validity of the contract had been proved in earlier litigation and
contended that the defendants were estopped from interposing their defense.
Id. Since the defendants had not been parties to the earlier litigation, the
Court held that the plaintiffs were precluded from raising collateral estoppel.
Id. at 39-46.
35. Id. at 40-41. The Court stated:
It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American juris-
prudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a
litigation in which he is not designated as a party by service of
process. . . . A judgment rendered in such circumstances is not en-
titled to the full faith and credit which the Constitution and statutes
of the United States . . .prescribe ... ; and judicial action enforcing
it against the person or property of the absent party is not that due
process which the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require.
Id. (citations omitted).
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There are several traditionally recognized exceptions to the Hans-
berry rule. 86 First, a litigant's interests may have been advanced by a
representative party in the earlier action.37 This exception has his-
torically been limited to narrowly drawn situations; 38 a party is not
deemed to have been represented by an earlier litigant unless the rela-
tionship between the two is contractual, fiduciary, established by law,
or specially recognized by the court.39
A second general exception to the Hansberry rule is commonly
called privity.40 Where privity exists, the precluded litigant is deemed
to have had his day in court vicariously because of either a close rela-
tionship to, or an identity of interest with, the original litigant.41 It
has been stated that there is no set rule for determining when a
relationship between two entities will be sufficient to give rise to a
finding of privity; 42 rather, such a determination must be made based
upon the facts and circumstances of each case.43 Courts have been
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 111, Comment a (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1977); lB J. MooRE, supra note 19, 0.411[1], at 1251-59.
37. See Kersh Lake Dist. v. Johnson, 309 U.S. 485, 489-91 (1940) (all
holders of certificates of land ownership represented by individual holders in
litigation declaring land free and clear of taxes); Expert Elec. Co. v. Levine,
554 F.2d 1227, 1233 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977) (individual
contractors' interests held to be represented by their trade association in earlier
litigation); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 1127, at 585-90; 1B J.
MOORE, supra note 19, 0.411[1], at 1254; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS §§ 84 & 85 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
38. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 11.22, at 575-76.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 84 & 85 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1975). Section 84 of the Restatement confers representative status in persons
contracting for such status. Id. Section 85 lists the following relationships as
also conferring such status: trustee-beneficiary; agency; fiduciary manager of
property; citizen and governmental authority entrusted to protect his rights;
and class representative in a class action. Id.
40. See lB J. MOORE, supra note 19, $ 0.411[l], at 1251-59.
41. See generally Comment, The Expanding Scope of the Res Judicata Bar,
54 TEx. L. REV. 527 (1976); Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1485 (1974). See also lB J. MOORE, supra note 19, 0.411[l], at
1252-53.
42. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 618
(1926). In Schendel, the Court stated that there are no set tests to determine
privity; rather the courts must make an ad hoc determination based on the
facts and circumstances of each case. Id. This form of analysis, coupled with
the modern blurring of the theory of privity itself, has lead one commentator
to note that privity is more a term used to describe a court's conclusion than
one which illuminates its analysis: "[P]rivity states no reason for including or
excluding one from the estoppel of a judgment. It is merely a word used to
say that the relationship between the one who is a party on the record and
another is close enough to include that other within the res judicata." Com-
ment, supra note 41, at 529, quoting Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d
419, 423 (3d Cir.) (Goodrich, J., concurring), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
For a discussion of the modern blurring of the theory of privity, see note 43
infra.
43. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 618
(1926). In Schendel, the Court noted that the rules of privity are not rules of
form but rules of substance. Id. Thus, even though under state law there
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split in recent years over the boundaries of privity.4 4 Several courts
have expanded the concept to include parties whose only interrelation-
ship is the fact that they seek to achieve the same ends in separate law-
suits against a single litigant.45 Other courts continue to adhere to a
was no legal relationship between administrators appointed in different states,
the federal court should properly have looked beyond the formal arrange-
ment to determine that they, in fact, represented the same interests. Id. at
620-23.
Despite the apparent ad hoc manner of determining privity, legal com-
mentators have attempted to formulate categories of situations in which privity
will be found. See, e.g., lB J. MOORE, supra note 19. One such classification
scheme, reflecting the traditional notions of privity, finds three such categories.
Id. First, where two parties "share a concurrent relationship to the same
right of property"; second, where they share a "successive relationship to the
same right of property"; and third, where both parties are representatives of
the interests of the same person. Id. 0.411[1], at 1255.
A second classification scheme, reflecting the recent growth of the concept of
privity, finds four categories: first, between persons who "share a substantial
identity of interests with parties to the prior suit;" second, between persons who
"exercised control over the original action;" third, between persons who "were
represented as part of a class;" and fourth, between persons who "have a suc-
cessive interest in the litigated property right." Comment, supra note 41, at
529-33.
As might be inferred from the latter classification scheme, the distinctions
between the concepts of privity, representation, and equitable preclusion have
been diluted in recent years. See id. at 530. For a discussion of equitable pre-
clusion, see notes 62-77 and accompanying text infra. The American Law
Institute, recognizing this dilution, and finding that privity is more of an ulti-
mate conclusion than a functional test, has advocated an abandonment of the
concept altogether. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 111, Comment a
(Tent. Draft No. 4 (1977)).
44. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text infra.
45. See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Admiral Merchants Motor
Freight, Inc., 486 F.2d 717 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113 (1973); Proctor
& Gamble Co. v. Byers Transp. Co., 355 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Mo. 1973), af'd
sub nom., Western Elec. Co. v. Burlington Truck Lines, 501 F.2d 928 (8th
Cir. 1974).
In Aerojet, a local government was precluded from litigating the propriety
of a conveyance of land where the transferor had previously resisted that trans-
fer in court. 511 F.2d at 713. The parties were deemed to be in privity simply
because neither wished the transferee to obtain the land, and in spite of the fact
that the original party had failed to raise the grounds set forth by the second.
Id. at 719-20.
In Proctor & Gamble, the trial court relied on several other criteria in
addition to the similarity of the interest between the parties. 355 F. Supp. at
557. The court first noted that the parties to both suits belonged to an asso-
ciation formed to advance, and which actually had represented, their interests
before a local government agency. Id. at 556-57. See also Expert Elec., Inc. v.
Levine, 554 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977) (individual
contractors bound by judgment against their trade association). The Proctor &
Gamble court then noted that both groups were represented by the same counsel.
355 F. Supp. at 557-58. See also Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 F.2d 876
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas
Int'l Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 2184 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977). Finally, the Proctor & Gamble court
found that the party seeking preclusion was an administrative agency whose
determinations, to be effective, must be freed from the uncertainty resulting
from unlimited collateral attacks. 355 F. Supp. at 557. See also United States
1980-81]
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more traditional concept of privity which requires a legal or quasi-legal
relationship between the parties in addition to an identity of claims.4 6
Finally, some courts, following the lead of the American Law Institute,47
have abandoned the concept of privity altogether.48
The final class of exceptions to the rule of Hansberry v. Lee estops
the litigant who had not been a party to the earlier action, but who,
during the pendency of that action, had acted in a manner which
"justly should result in his being denied opportunity to relitigate the
matters previously in issue." 49 One such mode of conduct is a failure
to intervene in the earlier case when intervention was possible.50
v. Burlington Truck Line, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 582, 588 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Vestal,
Res Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 367-68 (1974).
For a general discussion of the new interpretation which courts are giving
privity, see Vestal, Claim Preclusion and Parties in Privity: Sea-Land Services v.
Gaudet in Perspective, 60 IOWA L. REV. 973 (1975); Comment, supra note 41.
46. See, e.g., Consumers Union of the United States v. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.,
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 445 U.S. 375(1980) (neither similarity of purpose, similarity of claim, nor proponent's position
as an administrative agency justify a finding of privity).
47. See note 43 supra.
48. Instead of relying on privity, some of these courts follow a "same claim"
rationale in which the litigant is precluded from litigating the same cause of
action against the same defendant. See, e.g., Cauefield v. Fidelity and Cas. Co.,
378 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967) (preclusion applied to
prevent cemetery owner from being subjected to multiple actions by various plot
owners); In re Air Crash Disaster near Dayton, Ohio, 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D.
Ohio 1972), rev'd sub nom., Humphreys v. Tahn, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973)(preclusion of claim which was similar to those litigated in earlier multi-district
litigation suit).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § Ill, Comment a (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1977). The Restatement includes in its list of such conduct: controlling
the original litigation; allowing the use of one's name as a party; and agreeing
to be bound by the litigation. Id. See also American Safety Flight Systems v.
Garrett Corp., 528 F.2d 288, 289 (9th Cir. 1975) (participating non-party may be
precluded if he has right to participate and control suit or defense); Simons v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 353 F.2d 608, 612 (5th Cir. 1965) (person who took over,
financed, and directly participated in defense of another was bound by the
outcome of that suit).
The conduct which results in preclusion under this class of exceptions to
Hansberry must satisfy two criteria. First, the parties to the original action
must rely on the conduct as a representation that the outsider intends to be
bound by the judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 111,
Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). Second, the original parties' reliance
must be reasonable and justified. Id. In the leading case of Souffront v.
Compagnie des Sucreries, the United States Supreme Court stated:
The persons for whose benefit, to the knowledge of the court and of all
the parties to the record, litigation is being conducted cannot, in a legal
sense, be said to be strangers to the cause. The case is within the prin-
ciple that one, who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of another
to establish and protect his own right . . . and who does this openly to
the knowledge of the opposing party is as much bound by the judgment
. . . as he would be if he had been a party to the record.
217 U.S. 475, 486-87 (1910).
50. See, e.g., Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S.
102 (1968) (owner of automobile potentially precluded by failure to intervene in
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The federal rules for consolidating actions, particularly the
joinder 51 and intervention 52 rules, reflect a concern for the outsider
who may be affected by the outcome of a dispute between two named
parties.53 If an outsider's ability to protect his interests would be
earlier action against driver's estate); Penn-Central Merger and N.W. Inclusion
Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968) (issues resolved in earlier case in which all parties had
opportunity to participate are binding on all such parties to second action. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975);
notes 62-69 and accompanying text infra.
While a failure to participate in an action seems diametrically opposed to
the other conduct which produces preclusion - participation in the prior action,
allowing the use of one's name in a prior action, or controlling the prior suit -
the concepts of res judicata and intervention as of right have traditionally been
linked. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1907, at 484-92 (1972). Prior to 1966, a court was required to grant the appli-
cation for intervention only if the applicant would be bound, in a res judicata
sense, by the outcome of the ongoing action, and only if his interests were not
already represented. See Sam Fox Pub. Co. v. Unied States, 366 U.S. 683, 694
(1961). Of course, if the outsider was not a party, and was unrepresented by a
named party, he could not be bound. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra,
at 484-85. If his interests would be represented, he would be bound and would
fail to qualify for intervention. See id. In recognition of this "Catch 22", the
rules were amended in 1966. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Com-
mittee: Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I) 81 HARv. L.
REv. 356, 400 (1967). For a discussion of the current rules of intervention of
right, see notes 56-60 and accompanying text infra.
51. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 & 20.
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) 8 24(a)(2). Rule 19(a) provides in pertinent
part:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will
not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be
joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief can-
not be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposi-
tion of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multi-
ple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed in-
terest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be
made a party.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
Rule 24(a)(2) provides in pertinent part:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene
in an action: . . . (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is
so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the appli-
cant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
These rules were amended in 1966 to protect not only those who would be
affected in a res judicata sense but also to protect those whose "ability to protect
their interests would be impaired." See Kaplan, supra note 50, at 400. The
1966 amendments have been read most expansively by some courts which find
that the mere stare decisis effect of an action might affect an applicant's interest
to the degree necessary to satisfy the requirement. See, e.g., Blake v. Pallan, 544
F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1977); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th
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impaired by the decision in an ongoing action, or if his absence would
mean that the dispute between the named parties would not be finally
resolved, it is the duty of the named parties, or of the court, if feasible,54
to join him in that action.58 If, under these circumstances, the outsider
is not so joined, he may apply for intervention as of right 11 and the
court, with limited exceptions,5 7 must permit intervention. 5
The rules also provide for permissive joinder, a procedural mech-
anism by which named parties may subject outsiders, whose ability to
protect their rights would otherwise not be affected by their action, to
one final judgment if a common question of fact and law is presented.5 9
Concomitantly, outsiders who desire a single resolution of a common
Cir. 1967). With this enhanced opportunity to participate, several commentators
believe, came an increased duty for outsiders to intervene or face the conse-
quences of res judicata. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 11.31,
at 598-99; McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv.
707, 718-19 (1976).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Joinder would be inappropriate or impossible
if the additional party would destroy the court's jurisdiction or if service upon
that party were impossible. Id. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
50, § 1607, at 59-65.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). The duty to join all potentially affected out-
siders rests on the parties and the courts for two reasons. First, it is the parties
who would be subjected to multiple actions and inconsistent obligations if the
absentees remained unjoined. See White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray, 387
F. Supp. 1202, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Second, since the outsiders' rights may
be affected by the judgment in which they had no opportunity to participate,
their due process rights may be violated. See Osborne v. Campbell, 37 F.R.D.
339, 342 (D. W. Va. 1965).
56. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
57. See id. The court need not allow intervention of right if the appli-
cation was "untimely" or if the applicant's interests are adequately represented
by a named party. Id.
Normally, the denial of intervention, of itself, does not give rise to a res
judicata or collateral estoppel effect as to the merits of the claim. See Brown
v. Wright, 137 F.2d 484, 487-88 (4th Cir. 1943). However, the question which
was decided in the denial of the motion - for example, that the application
was untimely, that the court had no jurisdiction or that the intervenors stated
no cause of action - is a final judgment entitled to preclusive effect. See
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Seaboard Coast Line
R.R., 413 F.2d 19, 23-24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
58. See FED. R. Cry. P. 24(a)(2).
59. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a). Rule 20(a) provides in pertinent part:
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any
right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of
these persons will arise in the action. All persons . . . may be joined
in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect or aris-
ing out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences if any question of law or fact is common to all de-
fendants will arise in the action.
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issue, may petition for permissive intervention. 60 As their titles indi-
cate, these rules are designed for convenience, rather than the pro-
tection of the parties and outsiders.61
The Supreme Court, in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co.
v. Patterson 62 - a case which decided shortly after the intervention
rules were amended in 1966 63 - suggested that a failure to join an
earlier action might give rise to preclusion by collateral estoppel. 64 The
Provident Tradesmens Court considered a case in which the Third
Circuit had vacated the district court decision because the parties failed
to join an outsider, Dutcher, as an indispensible party under Rule
19.65 Finding that Dutcher was not an indispensible party, the Su-
preme Court, in dicta, stated that his failure to intervene might result
in his being collaterally estopped should he later attempt to litigate
the issues considered in the first case.66 Dutcher's failure to intervene
in Provident Tradesmens could be characterized as egregious, 67 and
accordingly, the Provident Tradesmens Court did not mention any due
process concerns in stating that his failure to intervene might be pre-
clusive. 68
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). Rule 24(b)(2) provides, in pertinent
part: "Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an
action: . . . (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common." Id.
61. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 50, § 1652, at 265; Id. § 1912
at 552-53.
62. 390 U.S. 102 (1968). In Provident Tradesmens, the estates of several
persons killed in an automobile accident separately sued the estate of the
negligent driver. Id. at 104. The owner of the car, Dutcher, was not joined
as a defendant in the Provident Tradesmens' action. Id. The other cases in
which Dutcher was named as a defendant had not gone to trial when the
Court addressed the case. Id. Dutcher would have been liable only if he
established that the driver of the car had no permission from Dutcher to use
the vehicle. Id. at 105-06.
63. See notes 50 8c 53 and accompanying text supra.
64. 390 U.S. at 114. See also Penn-Central Merger and N.W. Inclusion
Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 504-06 (1968); 1B J. MOORE, supra note 19 0.411[11], at
114 n.10 (1980 Supp.); Note, Preclusion of Absent Defendants to Compel
Intervention, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1551, 1562 (1979).
For a case illustrating an earlier application of this doctrine, in admiralty
cases, see Cummins Diesel Mich., Inc. v. The Falcon, 305 F.2d 721 (7th Cir.
1962) (nonparty with notice who failed to intervene was bound by judgment).
65. 390 U.S. at 104, citing FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
66. 390 U.S. at 114. The Court stated: "[I]t might be argued that Dutcher
should be bound by the previous decision because, although technically a non-
party, he had purposely bypassed an adequate opportunity to intervene. We
do not now decide whether such an argument would be correct under the
circumstances of this case." Id.
67. See id. at 104-06. Dutcher was the owner of the car involved in the
accident, his insurer was made a party defendant, and he was a witness on
the insurance company's behalf. Id.
68. See id. For a discussion of the due process issues which might be
presented should a failure to intervene operate as estoppel, see McCoid, supra
note 53, at 718-19. This commentator finds a denial of due process only where
51
Editors: Federal Courts and Procedure
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court's suggestion that a failure to intervene might
give rise to preclusion by collateral estoppel has not attracted many
adherents.6 9 However, many courts have adopted the apparent rational
of Provident Tradesmens - that subsequent challenges to judgments
by those who do not exercise their procedural rights will not be per-
mitted 70 - under a theory called equitable preclusion3 1 This theory
of preclusion focuses not only upon a litigant's failure to take ad-
vantage of his opportunity to participate in the earlier action, 72 but
the plaintiff had no notice of the original action or where he was deprived of
his opportunity to be adequately heard. Id. For a discussion of the due
process concerns triggered by any preclusion of non-parties, see notes 34-35
and accompanying text supra.
69. For cases which have adopted the suggestion of Provident Tradesmens,
see Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 459 F. Supp. 507, 513 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978)
(state which failed to intervene in original action should be precluded from
relitigating question in its own action); Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373,
1375 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 569 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922
(1979) (plaintiffs' collateral challenge disallowed after having declined to accept
an opportunity to intervene).
On the other hand, several courts have unequivocally stated that a mere
failure to intervene would not result in estoppel. See, e.g., McGhee v. United
States, 437 F.2d 995, 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Show-World Center, Inc. v. Walsh,
438 F. Supp. 642, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Proctor & Gamble v. Byers Trans. Co.,
355 F. Supp. 547, 557 (W.D. Mo. 1973), ajf'd sub nom., Western Elec. Co. v.
Burlington Truck Line, 501 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1974).
70. See, e.g., NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366-68 (1973) (collateral
challenge of judgment forbidden when challengers waited for years, and when
challenge would inconvenience original parties); Smith v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
615 F.2d 683, 684 (5th Cir. 1980) (employees not permitted collateral attack on
udgment when they had declined opportunity to participate in action); Black
White School Children v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 464 F.2d 1030, 1030 (6th
Cir. 1972) (collateral challenge impermissible if intervention rights not ex-
hausted); Construction Indus. Combined Comm. v. International Union of
Operating Engineers, 67 F.R.D. 664, 665 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (collateral challenge
impermissible if other procedural avenues remain open).
71. For a discussion of equitable preclusion, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
supra note 10, § 11.31, at 598-99. Professors James and Hazard list the fol-
lowing elements as requisites for the invocation of equitable preclusion:
(1) There had been a prior action involving the same claim or
affecting the same property as is involved in the second action; (2)
The party seeking to maintain the second action knew of the first
action and could then have asserted the claim he now seeks to assert,
either by intervening in the first action or by bringing in as a pary
[sic] thereto the person against whom he now asserts his claim;
(3) The person against whom the claim is asserted in the second ac-
tion was apparently relying on the first action to be dispositive of the
controversy out of which the claim arises; and (4) The party asserting
the claim in the second action knew, or reasonably should have
known, of that reliance.
id. at 598.
72. Id. § 11.31, at 598. See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp v. Askew, 511 F.2d
710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975) (local government precluded
from litigating propriety of conveyance of land where transferor had previously
resisted that transfer in court); Howe Coal Co. v. Prairie Coal Co., 362 F. Supp.
1117, 1124 (W.D. Ark. 1973) (person who failed to assert rights in judicial pro-
ceedings bound by the outcome of those proceedings).
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also upon the propriety of his refusal,75 and the original litigants'
reliance upon the impression of the finality given to the earlier judg-
ment by the non-litigant's failure to join.74 In the Third Circuit this
concept was approved when, without opinion, the court affirmed the
district court's opinion in Oburn v. Shapp 75 which stated that the rule
of Hansberry v. Lee protects only those persons who were not given
opportunity to participate in the action whose outcome they subsequently
challenged.76 Because the Oburn litigants were still able to join the
original action, the district court denied them the opportunity to sub-
sequently attack the order. 77
Against this background, the Third Circuit addressed the issue
of whether the Society Hill plaintiffs were precluded from asserting their
claims. 7 8 The court began its analysis by stating the general rule that
no person may be bound by a judicial determination to which he was
not a party.70 Dismissal of the plaintiffs' action, according to the court,
would be a denial of due process unless one of the exceptions to this
general rule was applicable.8 °
73. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 11.31, at 598. See, e.g.,
Christianson v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 540 F.2d 472, 474 (10th Cir. 1976) (in-
surance carriers with notice of lawsuit and with no reason not to join acquiesced
to judgment in that suit); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 111, Comment
b (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
74. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 11.31, at 598. See, e.g., Eyman
v. Marsa Development Corp., 301 F. Supp. 931, 932-33 (1969) (litigant who failed
to elect remedies under Securities Act action produced justifiable reliance that
separate suit would not be commenced); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 111, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
75. 70 F.R.D. 549 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 968 (1977). In Oburn, non-minority police officers sued officials
of the state of Pennsylvania, contending that state employment practices, as
enforced through a court-ordered consent decree, discriminated against white
males. Id. at 550-51.
76. 70 F.R.D. at 552. The court stated: "Hansberry stands for the proposi-
tion that a stranger to a prior suit, who lacks any opportunity to timely contest
the validity of the final judgment rendered in that prior suit, may not be bound
by the prior judgment .... " Id., citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
77. 70 F.R.D. at 552. Because the original order was in the form of an in-
junction, the issuing court retained jurisdiction and the plaintiffs were entitled
to apply for intervention. Id.
78. 632 F.2d at 1049-53. The court addressed the question of estoppel by
failure to intervene in the text of the opinion. Id. Estoppel by privity was
addressed in a footnote. Id. at 1050 n.4. The majority did not address the issue
of estoppel by representation. For a general discussion of these types of estoppel,
see notes 37-39, 40-48, & 49-68 and accompanying text supra.
79. 632 F.2d at 1049-53, quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940).
The court quoted Hansberry to illustrate the due process concerns which inhere
in cases where nonparties are alleged to be precluded by prior actions. See 632
F.2d at 1050. For a discussion of the due process questions where estoppel by
failure to intervene is claimed, see McCoid, supra note 53, at 718-19. For the
quote excerpted by the court, see note 35 supra.
80. 632 F.2d at 1050, citing Consumers Union of the United States v. Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
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The court then summarily considered the relationship between the
attempt to intervene in the prior suit and the plaintiffs' challenge to
the decree ultimately reached in that suit.81 While the court noted
that the parties to the previous action, whose attempt to intervene had
been denied as a result of their failure to present a timely application,
would be precluded from relitigating their contentions, 8 2 it refrained
from determining whether the earlier applicants and the plaintiffs before
it were in privity.83 Instead, the court concluded that, because the
original applicants had no opportunity to present the merits of their
claim, the plaintiffs could not be barred regardless of whether they
were in privity with the parties to the first action.84
The court next addressed the question of whether the plaintiffs
were estopped from raising their contentions because they had failed
to intervene in the prior action. 85 The court attempted to answer this
question by using a balancing test in which the interests in the finality
of an earlier judgment were weighed against the unfairness or lack of
due process to the collateral challengers, should their action be pre-
cluded.8 6 The interests in protecting an individual's due process rights,
grounds sub nom. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States,
455 U.S. 375 (1980).
81. 632 F.2d at 1050 n.4. The court addressed the dissent's arguments that
plaintiffs should be bound because of their relationship to the applicants for
intervention in the 1974 action between the tenants and the R.D.A. Id. See id.
at 1063-66 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the prior action, see
notes 3-6 and accompanying text supra.
82. 632 F.2d at 1052. The court reached this conclusion under its formula-
tion of a rule of equitable estoppel which precludes those whose failure to inter-
vene is unreasonable and unjustified. Id. See notes 85-94 and accompanying
text infra.
83. 632 F.2d at 1050 n.4. The court did not determine whether the plain-
tiffs were in fact in privity with the original applicants for intervention, although
it strongly suggested that they were. Id. The defendants did not attempt to
advance preclusion on a privity theory; surprisingly, privity entered the case as
an issue when raised by plaintiffs. See id. at 1064 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
84. 632 F.2d at 1050 n.4. The court stated:
[W]e do not claim, as the dissent contends, that the Association escapes
the res judicata bar simply because it was not a party to the Salvitti
suit. Rather, we conclude that the Association is not barred by res
judicata because the other property owners were denied intervention
and did not have an adjudication on the merits of the issues raised by
the plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, the district court in the present
case adjudicated the Association's legal rights on the basis of a prior
suit in which the Association's interests went entirely unrepresented.
Id. (emphasis by the court).
85. Id. at 1050-51. For a discussion of preclusion caused by a failure to
intervene, see notes 62-77 and accompanying text supra.
86. 632 F.2d at 1050-51, citing Oburn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. at 552. For a
discussion of Oburn, see notes 75-77 and accompanying text supra. For a dis-
cussion of the due process requirements of notice and the opportunity to be
heard, see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. at 40-41; notes 34 & 35 and accompanying
text supra. The Society Hill court also recognized that the finality of earlierjudgments is important to the original litigants whose later conduct is to be
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represented by Hansberry, were, according to the court, nearly absolute.8 7
However, the court cited Oburn 88 to illustrate the proposition that the
right to be heard need only be offered once.8 9 If this opportunity was
not utilized, the competing interest in the finality of judgments might
preclude a collateral challenge.9 0
While the court had no adjudicated facts to which its balancing
test could be applied,91 two general rules were announced. First, the
court stated that no collateral challenges would be permitted if the
challenger still retained the opportunity to intervene in the original
action.92 Second, if the opportunity to intervene had been presented,
but had not been utilized, the recipient would be precluded if his failure
to intervene was unjustified or unreasonable. 93 While the court did not
elaborate on the factors which would lead to a finding of unreasonable
or unjustified failure,94 it held that, on the facts as averred by the
premised upon the outcome of that litigation. 632 F.2d at 1050-51. Thus, the
availability of collateral challenge should be limited to the extent consistent with
due process and Hansberry. Id.
87. 632 F.2d at 1050.
88. Id. at 1051, citing 70 F.R.D. at 552. For a discussion of Oburn, see
notes 75-77 and accompanying text supra.
89. 632 F.2d at 1051, citing 70 F.R.D. at 552. For an excerpt of the Oburn
opinion quoted by the court, see note 76 supra.
90. 632 F.2d at 1051.
91. Id. at 1048. The case was on appeal from the district court's granting
of plaintiff's motion for a judgment on the pleadings. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P.
12(c); note 11 supra. Thus, the court viewed the case in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff. Id.
92. 632 F.2d at 1051. Thus, the court adopted the holding of Oburn v.
Shapp as a defined rule of collateral estoppel. The Oburn court had decided
that Hansberry does not guarantee the right to a collateral attack unless all other
procedural avenues to participate were foreclosed. 70 F.R.D. at 552. Thus,
collateral attack was denied when intervention in the original action remained
possible. Id. For a discussion of Oburn, see notes 75-77 and accompanying
text supra. In addition, the court cited Black 8c White Children v. School Dist.
of Pontiac, 464 F.2d 1030, 1031 (6th Cir. 1972); McAleer v. American Tel. &c Tel.
Co., 416 F. Supp. 435, 438 (D.D.C. 1976) as cases in which the same result and
rule had been reached. 632 F.2d at 1051. For a discussion of the rules which
these cases represent, see text accompanying note 70 supra.
In the Society Hill case, the court noted that the judge who approved the
consent decree in the 1974 case had not retained jurisdiction. 632 F.2d at 1051-
52. Thus it was impossible for the plaintiffs to intervene in that action. Id.
Moreover, the stipulation in the consent decree which allowed the parties to
return to that court was an inadequate substitute as there was no guarantee that
the court's jurisdiction would be further invoked. Id. Thus, it was impossible
for the plaintiffs to intervene in the original action, and they could not be pre-
cluded under this rule. Id.
93. 632 F.2d at 1052. The Society Hill court delivered its conclusion with-
out citation to Provident Tradesmens. Id. For a discussion of Provident
Tradesmens, see notes 62-68 and accompanying text supra. Neither did the
court expressly cite to the concept of equitable preclusion. For a discussion of
equitable preclusion, see notes 69-77 and accompanying text supra.
94. See 632 F.2d at 1052. The court did note that, on the facts which would
have been presented by the applicants for intervention in the 1974 lawsuit -
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plaintiff,95 including lack of actual knowledge of the original suit until
it had neared completion, and a prompt filing of the complaint,96 the
test was not satisfied. 97 Since such averred facts must be accepted as
true,98 the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings 9 had
been improperly granted, 100 and the case was remanded to the district
court to develop the facts indicating whether plaintiffs' conduct was, in
fact, reasonable and justified.101
In her dissent, Judge Sloviter claimed that the majority's decision
"undermined the fundamental principle of finality of judgments" be-
cause it might permit one group of litigants to attack a judgment after
an earlier, nearly identical group had failed.102  Judge Sloviter chal-
lenged the majority's findings regarding collateral estoppel on three
specific grounds. °3 First, she stated that since the plaintiffs were in
privity with the applicants for intervention whose action was terminated
in a valid judgment, their action was precluded. 04 Second, she stated
actual knowledge of the pendency of the action for two and one half years
coupled with a willful failure to join - the "unjustified and unreasonable" test
would have been met. Id.
The court, in its hypothetical application of its rule to the would-be inter-
venors, made no distinction between those whose intervention would be as of
right and those who would qualify only for permissive intervention; these appli-
cants had been held not to qualify for intervention of right by the district court.
See Dodson v. Salvitti, 77 F.R.D. 674, 676 (E.D. Pa. 1977); note 5 supra. For a
discussion of intervention under the federal rules see notes 56-58 & 60 and
accompanying text supra. Nor did the court expressly mention reliance upon
the finality of the original judgment, either as a factor to ascertain reasonable-
ness, or as a component of the balancing test upon which it is premised. For a
discussion of the reliance factor as viewed by other courts, see note 74 and ac-
companying text supra.
95. 632 F.2d at 1052. See note 91 supra.
96. 632 F.2d at 1052.
97. Id.
98. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c); note 11 supra.
99. Id.
100. 632 F.2d at 1053.
101. Id. Thus, the new rule, as announced by the court, was made poten-
tially applicable to the plaintiffs.
102. 632 F.2d at 1061 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1061-68 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). See notes 104-107 and accom-
panying text infra.
104. Id. at 1064 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Judge Sloviter began her dis-
cussion by citing the development of the more liberal concept of privity. Id. at
1063 (Sloviter, j., dissenting), citing F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10 § 11.23
at 576; See Note, Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REV.
818, 855-56 (1952). For a discussion of the modern view of privity, see note 45
and accompanying text supra. The dissent noted that both the applicants and
the original plaintiffs were represented by the same attorney, both sought to
advance the same claims, and both represented the same interests. 632 F.2d at
1064 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). See notes 45 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
However, rather than applying the expanded concept of privity to the facts of
the case, Judge Sloviter focused upon the plaintiffs' admission of privity. 632
F.2d at 1064. (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Finding privity, the dissent believed
that the decision in the earlier case would bind the plaintiffs as well. Id.
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that because the plaintiffs' interests had been represented by the earlier
applicants for intervention, the preclusion of the original parties sim-
ilarly barred the plaintiffs from asserting their contentions. 105 Finally,
Judge Sloviter stated that the plaintiffs' failure to intervene had al-
ready been found to be unreasonable when the district court determined
that the original applicants' motion for intervention was untimely.106
Assuming that the plaintiffs' motion to intervene would likewise have
been viewed as dilatory, Judge Sloviter deemed that the plaintiffs fell
within the class of litigants whose actions were precluded due to their
unreasonable failure to intervene. 07
It is submitted that the Society Hill court's analysis was marred
by a misconception of the law of res judicata and privity.108 Spe-
cifically, it is suggested that the court committed a fundamental error
by refusing to determine whether the plaintiffs were in privity with
the applicants for intervention. 09 The issues of fact regarding the
reasonableness of the first group of neighborhood residents' failure to
intervene were fully litigated in the district court "10 and their resolu-
tion formed part of a final judgment which that group of residents is
forever barred from relitigating.111 Thus, if the Society Hill plaintiffs
were in privity, they too would be bound by the facts which the Third
Circuit found adequate to estop the first group of residents and a re-
mand to ascertain the propriety of the plaintiffs' failure to intervene
105. 632 F.2d at 1064 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Although there was no ex-
press authorization to provide representation, Judge Sloviter found that the
plaintiffs' interests had been represented in the earlier case, relying upon cases
which have been discussed as advancing the "same claim" rationale. Id. For a
discussion of the representative theory of preclusion, see notes 37-39 and ac-
companying text supra. For a discussion of other cases which have held that a
non-party is precluded from raising the same claim, see note 43 and accom-
panying text supra.
106. 632 F.2d at 1065-67 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). See Dodson v. Salvitti,
77 F.R.D. 674 (E.D. Pa. 1977); note 5 supra. For a discussion of the res judicata
effect of a denial of intervention, see note 57 supra.
107. 632 F.2d at 1066-67 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). For the test adopted by
the majority, see note 93 and accompanying text supra.
108. See 632 F.2d at 1050 n.4. For a discussion of the rules of privity, see
notes 40-48 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the law of res
judicata, see notes 18-35 and accompanying text supra.
109. 632 F.2d at 1050 n.4. While the court suggested that, under more
modern cases, privity might be found, privity was not deemed to be relevant
because the applicants for intervention never presented the merits of their
claims. Id., citing Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight,
Inc., 486 F.2d 717 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973). See note 45
and accompanying text supra.
110. See 77 F.R.D. at 677; note 5 supra.
111. 77 F.R.D. at 677. For a discussion of the preclusive effect of judgments
in abatement, see notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra. The issue of reason-
ableness, and the determination of the facts necessary to support its resolution
are foreclosed, despite the trial court's basing its denial of intervention on two
independent grounds. See note 31 supra.
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would be proper only if the court had actually determined that no
privity existed. 112
Absent the Third Circuit's adoption of the Supreme Court's sug-
gestion in Provident Tradesmens,1" 3 that an unreasonable failure to in-
tervene in an ongoing action might preclude a subsequent attack of
the judgment, 114 neither the applicants for intervention 115 nor the
Society Hill plaintiffs would be precluded from bringing their own
suit.."0 It is submitted that the substance of this rule, 1 7 if read in
conjunction with both the facts of the case 118 and the rationale used
in its formulation, 1 9 is merely a restatement of a branch of the larger
concept of equitable preclusion. 120 As in traditional equitable pre-
clusion analysis,' 21 the court based its rule on a balancing test which
weighs the interest in the finality of judgments against the unfairness
resulting from preclusion, 122 the propriety of the outsider's conduct
being the determinative factor in that balancing test. 23 It is probable
that, on remand, facts may be ascertained which would justify the
application of the doctrine of equitable preclusion. 2 4 Thus, if future
112. For a discussion of the preclusive effects of a judgment on privies to
the action, see notes 40-48 and accompanying text supra.
113. 390 U.S. at 114. For a discussion of Provident Tradesmens, see notes
62-68 and accompanying text supra.
114. 632 F.2d at 1052. For a discussion of this rule as stated by the Society
Hill court, see notes 93-97 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of
the reception of this rule in other jurisdictions, see note 69 supra.
115. The applicants for intervention would not be precluded because the
final decision in their case established only that their application for intervention
was untimely and that they did not qualify for intervention as of right. See
note 5 supra. Thus, this was a judgment of abatement and the applicants would
normally be free to commence a different action. See notes 30-31 and accom-
panying text supra. However, the facts as conclusively determined by the trial
court, indicated that they would be precluded under the court's formulation of
the rule of preclusion for failure to intervene, despite the failure to present the
merits of their claim. See note 57 supra.
116. The Society Hill plaintiffs may be subject to the rule if the district
court, on remand, determines that their failure to intervene was unjustified or
unreasonable. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
117. See 632 F.2d at 1052. For a discussion of the court's articulation of its
rule, see notes 93-97 and accompanying text supra.
118. See 632 F.2d at 1049-50; notes 1-12 & 124 and accompanying text
supra.
119. See 632 F.2d at 1050; note 86 and accompanying text supra. The
court reasoned that the need for finality of judgments outweighed the due
process interests when the party had failed to intervene. Id.
120. For a discussion of the equitable preclusion theory of estoppel, see
notes 71-77 and accompanying text supra.
121. For a discussion of the elements of equitable preclusion, see note 71
supra.
122. See 632 F.2d at 1050; note 86 and accompanying text supra.
123. See 632 F.2d at 1050-53; notes 93-97 and accompanying text supra.
124. See 632 F.2d at 1049-50. Under an equitable preclusion analysis, the
facts must reveal the existence of two similar actions and an unused procedural
avenue for the inclusion of the subsequent challengers in the original action.
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courts look to the entire case to determine whether the rule should be
invoked, the results reached in subsequent cases will not be revolu-
tionary. 2
On the other hand, it is submitted that rather than formulating
rules having the appearance of black letter law 126 which might result
in mechanical application, 27 the court should have given lower courts
additional guidance on how the balancing test should be applied. 28
The court failed to define unreasonable or unjustified in any meaning-
ful way.129 Further, in weighing the interest in the finality of judg-
See note 71 supra. The facts must also indicate that the failure to use the
opportunity to consolidate created a justifiable reliance, on the part of the
original parties, that the judgment reached is unassailable. Id. In Society Hill,
it is submitted, these facts could be found to exist. The existence of two similar
actions and, as determined by the district court, the procedural opportunity to
participate, if such was promptly utilized, is unquestionable. See 632 F.2d at
1049-50. Moreover, the parties to the Society Hill case could reasonably assume
that the decision reached in their case was unassailable, having successfully
averted a challenge mounted by one group of residents which possibly would
be deemed to have represented all Society Hill residents. See id.
125. It is submitted that the results reached in future cases in which the
court's mode of analysis is used will mirror those used in an equitable preclusion
analysis, a modern privity analysis, or a same claim analysis. See, e.g., Aluminum
Co. of Am. v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc., 486 F.2d 717, 721 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113 (1973) (motor carriers who had not joined
agency determination of their rights precluded from challenging that ruling
under "privity" analysis); Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967) (preclusion under same claim analysis applied
to prevent multiple actions by separate cemetery plot owners raising the same
contentions).
126. See 632 F.2d at 1050-53. The court premised its initial holding upon
its balancing test. Id. at 1050. However, it is submitted that the court an-
nounced its rules as if its balancing of those competing interests could produce
no other results but those rules, regardless of the facts of the individual case.
See id. at 1052.
127. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 10, § 11.31 at 598-99; RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 111, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
Preclusion of a party who was not a privy to an original action and whose in-
terests were not represented in that action would result in those interests going
completely unrepresented. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. at 40-41; notes 34-35
and accompanying text supra. Because such a lack of representation would run
counter to Hansberry and the due process clause, it is submitted that the pre-
clusion should be ordered only after the court has ascertained that the non-
party's conduct clearly constitutes a waiver of his due process right to be heard
on the facts of his specific case.
128. See 632 F.2d at 1050-53; notes 94-97 and accompanying text supra.
The court neither specified those facts which might indicate preclusion nor indi-
cated that it was dealing with an unusual fact situation; e.g., one where the
subsequent challengers followed an unsuccessful attempt to intervene mounted
by a nearly identical group. See id. Thus, it is suggested, due to this lack of
express recognition of the unusual fact pattern, later courts may apply the rule
in future cases where these, or similar facts would not be present and where
preclusion, at least under current theories, would not be appropriate. For a
criticism of the implications of such potential applications, see notes 131-46 and
accompanying text infra.
129. See 632 F.2d at 1050-52. The court, rather than defining the elements
of its test, merely applied that test to two essentially hypothetical situations.
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ments, the court failed to utilize the concept of reliance, traditional in
equitable preclusion analysis, 1 0 which requires that the parties to the
action justifiably rely upon the outsider's conduct in order to give
rise to a cognizable interest in the finality of the judgment. 13'
It is submitted that the failure to emphasize and define the bal-
ancing test might lead to applications of the rule, not only to outsiders
whose conduct invoked reliance on the unassailability of a judgment,
but also to outsiders, including would-be permissive intervenors, whose
only "conduct" was a decision that their cause of action was sufficiently
unrelated to the original suit that they could properly delay the initia-
tion of their own suit until the first was resolved. 32 While the latter
application might result in increased judicial economy, it is suggested
that, in addition to interfering with the right to initiate and control
one's own lawsuit, 38 such preclusion squarely contradicts the assump-
Id. See notes 95-97 and accompanying text supra. The court illuminated its
rule merely by stating that the original applicants, who failed to intervene after
actual notice of two and one-half years, for the purpose of delay, would be guilty
of unreasonableness, but that plaintiffs, who claimed no actual notice and alleged
a prompt filing of their action to avoid delay, would not. 632 F.2d at 1052-53.
130. See notes 49 & 74 and accompanying text supra.
131. See 632 F.2d at 1052. While both Professors James and Hazard and
the Restatement specifically list conduct by the non-participant which can and
does produce reliance by the parties on the finality of the judgment rendered in
their case as an element of equitable preclusion, the Society Hill court, in its
test, required only "unjustified and unreasonable" conduct. Id. See F. JAMES
& G. HAZARD, supra note 10 § 11.31 at 598-99; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 111, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). However, the facts of the
Society Hill case might indicate that the original parties could have relied upon
the failure of the first group of intervenors as indicating that their judgment
was not susceptible to challenge. Thus, the court may have implicitly considered
a reliance element in its "unreasonable and unjustified" test. See note 124 and
accompanying text supra.
132. While this "conduct" may be characterized as letting the first group of
litigants 'test the water' or arrange lawsuits in order to get several chances to
litigate against one defendant, it is suggested that these tactics, when used by
those whose suits are relatively unrelated to the subject matter of the ongoing
action, were given legitimacy by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
notes 135-46 and accompanying text infra.
133. See Note, supra note 64, at 1569-70. The author stated:
Another basic constraint on the use of preclusion procedure to
compel intervention - and one relevant in every case - is the traditional
policy favoring the plantiff's control over the time, place, and scope of
his suit. This convention assures fairness to plaintiffs by allowing them
to present and conduct their case in the circumstances they consider
most favorable to their interests. It also serves policies of judicial effi-
ciency and repose since it maximizes the possibility that a potential
plaintiff might find satisfaction of his grievances without resort to the
courts. Thus, in determining the propriety of use of the preclusion
procedure, courts must balance the need for consolidation against the
harm caused plaintiffs by forcing the intervention of a disputant not
included in the original suit and the effect of forced intervention on the
orderly efficient administration of justice.
Id. at 1569 (footnotes omitted).
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tions built into the federal rules of procedure.8 4
Under the current rules, it is the duty of the parties or the court
to join any persons who might be bound by a decision reached in an
action.135 Those who are not joined may presume that they will not
be bound by the judgment and the original parties have no reason to
assume that the outsiders' claims are foreclosed by their suit. 36 Yet a
mechanical application of the court's rule without consideration of the
reliance element would not only result in the preclusion of these out-
siders, despite the fact that they were not joined, but would also shift
the burden of joining all potentially affected outsiders from the original
parties and the court to the outsiders themselves.137
Moreover, a reflexive application of the rule to permissive inter-
venors 138 seems to squarely contradict the distinction which the rules
draw between outsiders whose ability to protect their interests would
be impaired by the suit, and those whose interests would not be so
affected. 8 9  Permissive intervenors may rely on the fact that their
interests are so unrelated to the ongoing action that they lose nothing
by failing to intervene and that they might benefit by pursuing a
separate action which focuses only upon their interests. 140  Con-
comitantly, the original parties have no reason to assume that such an
outsider surrendered his claim merely because he did not opt to inter-
vene in their action.141 Indeed, if the final resolution of all disputes
involving a common question of law or fact142 were important to the
original parties, joinder, under Rule 20,143 is an available device. Yet
134. For a discussion of the rules of civil procedure, see notes 51-61 and
accompanying text supra.
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a); notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
136. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 50, § 1602, at 20-21; notes
51-61 and accompanying text supra.
137. It is submitted that the parties to the original suit, who originally had
the responsibility to join the outsider, reaps the benefit of the outsider's failure
to intervene since the outsider is now precluded from bringing his own suit.
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b); note 60 supra. The Society Hill case may
be viewed as precedent for applying its rules to permissive intervenors. See
note 94 supra.
139. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The rules of joinder and intervention
are bifurcated so that those whose interests would be impaired by separate
actions must be joined, or if applying for intervention, must be admitted. See
notes 51-60 and accompanying text supra. Those who are not so tied may
intervene, or may be joined only if the parties or the outsiders desire resolu-
tion. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
140. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
141. Id.
142. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20, 24(b)(2).
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 20. See note 59 and accompanying text supra. Of
course, the defendant may not use permissive joinder to compel all potential
claimants to join as plaintiffs, though, it is submitted that an indiscriminate
application of the court's rule could achieve the same results by forcing per-
missive intervention.
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an indiscriminate application of the rule to would-be permissive in-
tervenors would result in these outsiders being bound by actions which,
by definition, should not impair their ability to protect their rights. 4 4
It is submitted that this is a perversion of the assumptions built into
the federal rules which will result in an offensive use of preclusion which
would estop a total stranger to a prior suit by one who had been
successful in that action -, a type of offensive preclusion which, because
of Hansberry 145 and a recognition of an individual's right to a personal
action, has never been sanctioned. 146
Since the court did not emphasize the rationale for its new rule,' 47
it is submitted that the future application of that rule depends upon
how closely the case is read by subsequent courts. If these courts rely
upon the facts and tests used by the Third Circuit, in addition to study-
ing other current authorities, it is submitted that the rule will be
applied only to outsiders who, by their conduct, have clearly waived
their Hansberry rights. 48 If, however, subsequent courts view the case
as announcing a black letter rule which is to be mechanically applied,
claimants will be forced into multiparty litigation, a result clearly not
encouraged or sanctioned by the rules of procedure 149 or Hansberry.o50
While this speaks well for judicial economy and the interest in the
finality of judgments, it is submitted that future claimants will be
forced to waive their rights to initiate and control their own actions or
be precluded, contrary to Hansberry, by an action to which they were
not parties merely because they failed to intervene in that action
which, according to the rules, cannot affect their ability to maintain
separate actions.151
Steven C. Parmer
144. See note 60 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that an
indiscriminate application of the court's rule might lead to the elimination
of the distinction between of right and permissive intervention. Present per-
missive intervenors might rightfully argue that their failure to intervene would
result in their being bound by the adjudication, thus qualifying them for of
right intervention.
145. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). See notes 34-35 and accom-
panying text supra.
146. For a discussion of the applications of offensive preclusion, see note
22 supra.
147. See notes 126-31 and accompanying text supra.
148. For a discussion of Hansberry, see notes 34-35 and accompanying
text supra.
149. See notes 135-44 and accompanying text supra.
150. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
151. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
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